Commercial Real Estate

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‘Tis the season and I think it’s way overdue to put in a good word for sunny optimism.  It’s been a while since the Golden Turkeys, and I apologize for being offline.  This having to work for a living gets in the way of serious bloviating.  Here is what is bothering me.  The overall tone of the national dialogue as mediated through the mass media seems overly dark and bleak.  The Sunday talk shows and the business press seem to deliver day in and day out an entirely untoward and, in fact, largely data free bias toward pessimistic outcomes and gloom.  I think that’s wrong (so I’m really writing about how stupid and obdurately mule-headed, faux sophisticated pessimism about virtually everything really can be, but ode to that made for an awkward title.)
Continue Reading Ode to Optimism:  I’m Proudly Bullish (and not embarrassed to say so)!

As is our tradition here at Crunched Credit, each year, about this time, we award our Golden Turkey Awards.  Once again, I must say that we are utterly blessed with so many worthy candidates. The truly deserving have once again wrangled with vision and astounding persistence to earn a spot on our acclaimed list.  To…

Back in the febrile, hyperventilated times that birthed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (blessedly known simply as Dodd-Frank), one of the issues that energized the activists’ intent on “fixing” what was wrong was the notion that the ratings agencies were complicit in the overpricing of financial assets.  In a “want for a nail, a shoe was lost” sort of way, overpricing of financial assets caused asset bubbles which led to or exacerbated the apocalypse.  The culprit?  The issuer pay model by which the issuers which retained the ratings agencies to rate their securities paid the ratings agencies’ fees from the proceeds of the related securitization.  From a certain perspective, this was having the prisoners hire the guards.
Continue Reading Ratings Agencies in the Crosshairs

Long ago, I read a book by a man named Herman Kahn, one of the founders of the Hudson Institute and a well-known public intellectual.  The book was entitled On The Year 2000.  (He was more famous for that truly uplifting missive, On Thermonuclear War.)  I suspect I didn’t understand a lot of it, but I was jazzed by this apparently serious effort to peer into the future.  How cool!  Mr. Kahn was an interesting character; think of a banal-looking, rotund academician, who talked about nuclear annihilation like I discuss box scores.  He was, in fact, an inspiration for Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove and for General Jack D. Ripper’s famous line in that wonderfully dark comedy, “Casualties?  50 million…tops!”  A father of US nuclear deterrent strategy and a considerable intellect, he actually got much of what he thought of the Year 2000 wrong, but in a fun way.
Continue Reading Welcome to the Future

With apologies to Madeline Kahn, in this case, it indeed is twu, it’s twu! The CRE CLO technology is maturing and evolving into the stable, match term, non-recourse, non-marked to market, dynamic portfolio lender lever technology that its fans (me among them) always thought that it could be. It’s just taken some time.

Tainted by the wildly different, and in hindsight entirely zany, CRE CDO securitization from before the Great Recession (most, but not all, of which died ingloriously before that recession was over) and after having creeped back into usage in the marketplace between 2012 and 2016, the CRE CLO as a technology to securitize whole mortgage loans is finally maturing into a stable and useful tool in the toolbox of the portfolio lender. Growing from a handful of deals in the period 2012 through 2016, total CRE CLO production was around $15 billion; in 2017 it was $7.7 billion; in 2018 it was $14 billion; and in 2019 it would appear to be on track to perhaps be a $20 billion securitization market. Ignoring for the moment black swans, orange swans, dictators, Brexiteers and sundry other loons on a mission to derail our economy or the modern world writ large, the CRE CLO market sector should continue to grow at a respectable pace with only the obligatory brief respite shared by all structured products, during the next recession, whenever it might occur.
Continue Reading Like Bonds, But Not Bankers, the CRE CLO is Maturing

In order to avoid burying the lead, let me tell you where I’m going here.  The CRE securitization business is in trouble.  We need to throw out what biologists call the punctuated equilibrium, where once a system initially stabilizes, it thereafter changes little and resists radical change.  Elsewise, our business is at very material risk of irrelevance.

But to give you some time to mull all that over, let me set the table first.  I’ve been worried…Continue Reading It’s Time to Fix Securitization: Are We Dinosaurs Staring Into the Tar Pit?

In an effort to advance the conversation around climate change within the CRE finance community, Jason S. Rozes and Nitya Kumar Goyal recently published Climate Change Impact on Commercial Real Estate Finance — What the Industry Needs to Know Today, which provides a great foundation for understanding how climate change affects our industry and…

Note: This was republished on June 6, 2019 to reflect factual updates.

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending.  At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.

A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:

Sutton 58 is a case involving a defaulted New York City construction loan consisting of mortgage and mezzanine debt provided by Gamma Real Estate.  After a maturity default, Gamma’s attempt to foreclose on its equity collateral through a UCC foreclosure sale was hindered by the bankruptcy filings of the mortgage borrower and mezzanine borrower.

The borrowers were established as single-purpose bankruptcy-remote vehicles but subsequently acquired additional assets from one of the defendants (Sutton Opportunity), and took on debt from Prime Alliance (another one of the defendants – both controlled by the individual Pilevsky family defendants).  Sutton Opportunity obtained a 49% indirect stake in each borrower as a result of the asset transfer.  The additional assets and debt destroyed each borrower’s status as a “Single Asset Real Estate” entity under the Bankruptcy Code (or “SPE”), and allowed both entities to file a petition for bankruptcy.  Both the transfer of assets and the transfer of indirect equity interests in each borrower violated separateness covenants in the mortgage and mezzanine loan documents.Continue Reading “Nobody Fell Off the Turnip Truck Yesterday”: What’s at Stake for Commercial Real Estate Lenders in Sutton 58?

Beany & Cecil was a cartoon.  The Current Expected Credit Loss accounting rules, better known as CECL, which the FASB is insisting will go into effect at the beginning of next year for publicly traded banks and lenders and a year later for all other GAAP reporting entities is not.  Now, heaven forfend that I suggest that the work of the Financial Accounting Standards Board is cartoonish, but there’s a parallel in this pairing of harmless and obscured menace worth noting. 
Continue Reading Beany & CECL