Regulatory Reform

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I am congenitally pessimistic and some have, shockingly, called me cynical. Early last week, while we waited for Reg AB, I would have bet more than a dollar that there would have been a number of things in this final Rule which would disappoint.

Well, I was broadly wrong. The Rule as published, with its commentary (nearly 700 pages) is frankly… just not bad. Having been through it for a first go (and it is a slog) it is more notable for what it doesn’t do, than for what it does. It does not extend Reg AB to the 144A market as was suggested by the republished preliminary rule from 2011. It does not include the whacky waterfall computation program from that prior missive. It does not require all the transaction documents to be filed by the date of the preliminary prospectus. It does not impose its own bespoke version of risk retention as a condition to shelf registration. It does not turn some poor bastard who happens to be the CEO of the depositor into a guarantor of the success of the offering, and it does not continually reset a five-day pre-pricing requirement for the delivery of the final prospectus supplement when any late deal change occur.
Continue Reading Final REG AB Rules: Man Bites Dog

Long ago and far away, a radio show gave birth to the catchphrase “Who know what evil lurks in the hearts and minds of men?  The Shadow knows.”  I think, although I’m not entirely certain at this point, that the Shadow was a good guy, but deeply misunderstood and viewed with enormous suspicion by more main stream enforcers of right thinking and morality.  Shadows are where bad things happen, where the bad guy hides and jumps out when the teenage starlet inevitably walks into the darkened derelict house, saying in a little voice, “Hello, hello?  Billy, are you there?”  Bad things inevitably ensue.  Shadows are bad.

Okay, what’s this all about?  We need to stop the narrative right now that all financial market participants; funds, specialty finance companies, advisors, BDCs, etc., which are not insured depository institutions (let’s call them non-banks for short) are creatures of the shadows.  Shadows are bad, non-banks are in the shadows…ok, you get the picture.  Our traditional banks, which take deposits guaranteed by the US of A are under the loving and protective wing of the FDIC, the Federal Reserve or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (and yes dear Lord, the FSOC).  That makes sense, they take Caesar’s coin and Caesar is entitled to a bit of supervision.  But the non-banks do not; they risk private capital.  That makes a difference.
Continue Reading The Shadow: What’s in a Name – The Maleficence of Shadow Banking

Well, Halloween has come and gone and with the annual bacchanal of faux frisson over zombies, vampires and the like behind us, can we also put away risk retention anxieties like one of those annoying and morally disturbing Miley Cyrus costumes? Unfortunately not. The industry’s comments have all been neatly bundled and delivered to the multi-headed hydra which is the ad hoc joint rulemaking committee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, HUD, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Securities Exchange Commission and the FDIC and the leading lights of the regulatory apparatchik are presumably cuddled up before the fireplace this holiday season with a glass of Bordeaux diligently reading comment letters.Continue Reading Risk Retention Follies – Part Deux

The new Risk Retention Rule published jointly by the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Securities Exchange Commission, with a little help from the Federal Housing Finance Agency and HUD slouched into the light of day on August 28, in the lee of the holiday weekend. Reportedly, it’s been locked and loaded for months as the regulatory panjandrums wrestled over the politics of the Qualified Mortgage. Really? The day before the long weekend? Isn’t that a tell that it is less than entirely estimable? Didn’t Nixon resign on a Friday? It’s like maybe no one would notice the delivery of a long-anticipated 550 page opus which has, in its gift, the continued vitality of structured finance at large?Continue Reading Risk Retention Re-proposal: The Good, Bad, Ugly And Unintended

On August 28, 2013, six federal regulatory agencies (among them, the SEC, Federal Reserve, OCC and the FDIC (collectively, the “Agencies”)) released a 499 page second risk retention proposal (the “Second Proposal”). The Second Proposal covers risk retention for securitizers of all asset-backed securities, but also contains changes aimed directly at CLOs. For CLOs, the rules include both familiar provisions found in the first risk retention proposal (introduced in 2011) and new proposals, some of which are directed at alleviating the substantial burdens the Agencies themselves recognize the Second Proposal imposes on CLOs. Some of the proposals include new combinations of previously proposed forms of retention, new measurement metrics and holder eligibility criteria, hints at how grandfathering will be treated, a projected cash flow test for first-loss holders and an (likely ineffective) open market CLO option. The provisions outlined below do not reflect all changes found in the Second Proposal, but instead are meant to highlight some of the developments CLO participants may find important.Continue Reading Risk Retention Reproposal’s Impact on CLOs: Loan Arrangers Get Invited to the Party that No One Wants to Attend

While we here at CrunchedCredit recognize that many of our readers spend their days deep in commercial lending land, we also like to provide updates for our residential lending friends from time to time (and for our commercial lending friends who like to be able to impress their resi-friends at cocktail parties).

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”) is currently charged with defining a “Qualified Mortgage” (a “QM”). The federal banking agencies, the SEC, the FHFA and the Department of HUD are jointly charged with defining a “Qualified Residential Mortgage” (a “QRM”), and the QRM definition cannot be any broader than the QM definition. A narrowly…

I want to talk about structural complexity and innovation. Complexity has gotten a really bad name resulting from the collapse of many highly-structured transactions in the firestorm following the recession and Lehman’s collapse. That’s certainly an understandable reaction. Enormous losses were incurred on transactions barely understood by investors and perhaps by sponsors as well. And while I won’t go so far as to trot out the old saw, “Guns don’t kill people, people do,” the resulting hostility to complexity has conflated good complexity resulting from purpose-driven transaction structures and opaque, dysfunctional documentation and disclosure. The hostility toward complexity limits both risk mitigation and innovation, just at the time both are critically important to repair CRE debt capital markets.

Financial engineering is, in large measure, about risk transfer and the need to meet the needs of investors. It is a process of identifying risk, mitigating risk, and fine-tuning structure to do very specific things. Structures which can reduce deal risk and deliver solutions to very specific investor requirements will grow liquidity. With the growth of liquidity comes transactional efficiency and that way lies market growth.Continue Reading Complexity is Not the Enemy