Dodd-Frank

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As we look back each November to bestow the year’s crop of Golden Turkeys to the silliest and most annoying instances of regulatory overreach, legislative inanity, governmental misfeasance or the mere idiotic behavior of people without any help from the government apparatchiki, there’s always a glorious excess of candidates. This whole commentary thing would be really hard if the world made sense and behaved in a predictable, rational, Newtonian universe sort of way, but blessedly it does not.

So, as we get ready for the season of cheer, the season of desperate efforts to close yet one more deal and the nice calculation of bonuses, and before we imbibe too much good food and drink to be at all disciplined, here is our list for 2017:
Continue Reading CrunchedCredit.com’s 8th Annual Golden Turkey Awards

Or maybe not.  At the outset, let’s give credit where credit is due.  It was gratifying to read a governmental missive on the capital markets that made sense, showed an actual grasp of how markets function and an awareness of the issues confronting capital formation.  Best damn thing I ever read coming out of the swamp.

The Treasury Report on the capital markets published in early October is indeed pretty fantastic stuff.  The Report covers the Treasury’s recommendation on re-centering many of the rules around the capital markets over a wide range of regulatory issues important to securitization and capital formation.

Let’s focus on the provisions in this Report that are central to securitization.

These can be summarized as follows:

  • There should be one agency with the responsibility for the Risk Retention Rule and we should dispense with the committee-of-committee that’s been running the clown car for the past couple of years. The old saw that “a camel is a horse built by a committee” is certainly proven by the risk retention experience.
  • Regulatory bank capital requirements treat investment in non-agency securitized instruments punitively.
  • Regulatory liquidity standards unfairly discriminate against securitized products.
  • Sponsor risk retention as set out in the Risk Retention Rule represents an unnecessary cost imposed upon securitization.
  • Some of the new and improved (read: expanded) disclosure requirements under Dodd-Frank are unnecessarily burdensome.

In other words, our regulatory regime needs a certain amount of recalibration to achieve its goals of safety and soundness in the financial market place while not impeding capital formation. 
Continue Reading Treasury Report on the Capital Markets: A New Day

As an industry, we remain in high dudgeon over the inanity of much of Dodd-Frank, the ideological and often unhinged regulatory instincts of our various governments and the vast amount of effort, time and money it takes to comply with the mind-numbing complexity of rules and regulations that seem to be largely untethered from the goal of solving actual problems. We winge. We boviate. We testify, write white papers, fund PACs and pursue “engagements” with the regulatory apparatchiki in the pursuit of sensible relief. But do we still really care?

Are we witnessing a process of reconciliation? Could it be that the capital markets have found a way to thrive inside the current regulatory state’s bear hug?
Continue Reading Welcome to Stockholm! We Are Learning To Love Our Regulatory State

Here’s a headline for you:  We don’t know if a conventional CMBS securitization where risk retention bonds are retained by a B-buyer under an industry standard third party purchaser agreement achieves accounting sale treatment.  Failure of accounting sale treatment means the selling bank cannot book the gain and does not derecognize the underlying loans resulting in the entire portfolio of loans remaining on its balance sheet for both Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP, and presumably, for risk based capital purposes.

As might have been said by that great philosopher of the 20th Century: “You cannot possibly be serious!”

Commercial Mortgage Alert broke the story on Friday, August 11th and so I’m finally going to talk about the issue.  I’ve been itching to do so since early June when I became aware of the problem but it really didn’t seem there was a lot of upside for a broad industry discussion of the problem back then while the auditors and the internal finance teams at our banks and other CMBS sponsors were still pondering the issue.  But, after a good deal of mulling and to-ing and fro-ing, it’s still not resolved so I think it’s time to bring fun with GAAP out of the closet.Continue Reading Fun With GAAP:  CMBS at Risk

A standalone securitization of a portfolio of properties closed in June. To our knowledge, this was the first transaction in recent memory done in a direct issuance format.  In this case, direct issuance means that the sponsor organized the lender and the depositor as well as a borrower and crafted the loan between the lender and borrower, which was simultaneously closed and funded by the bond proceeds from the securitization at closing.  An additional unique feature in this transaction was that the sponsor met its obligations under the risk retention rules with a horizontal cash deposit equal to 5% of the fair value of the certificates.  More on this later.

In this annoying new world of risk retention, the direct issuance model embodied in this transaction can be a paradigm for transactions in the SASB space.
Continue Reading Direct Issuance is Here – A New Paradigm for Single Asset Single Borrower (SASB) Securitization

What in the world have we done to ourselves? Our CRE Securitization business, or at least the conduit part of our business, continues to shrink:  $800 billion in outstanding principal balance in 2007 and now, $400 billion?  Maybe, right now, we’re at a run rate of $50 billion per year.  Is that enough?  Does that deliver critical mass?  Are we a going concern?

Maybe.

As the business shrinks, the CMBS share of the Lehman Index (Bloomberg Index) continues to dwindle.   That imperils liquidity and the diminishment of liquidity itself becomes yet another reason to abandon the sector.  As that happens, some investors drop out, some “right size” their CMBS teams and as fewer analysts follow the space, the business again dwindles.  Net/net, investors lose interest as there are fewer and fewer reasons to buy CMBS bonds.  As the business gets smaller, less attention is paid by the mortgage banking community, fewer opportunities find their way to the CMBS window and other service providers are stressed. Wash, rinse and repeat until someone shuts off the lights and locks the door on the way out.

Okay, I’m overstating it a bit, but you get the idea.  We’ve got a problem.Continue Reading It’s Time to Bring Back the Square State Conduit:  If We Build It, They Will Come.

What if Dodd-Frank and Basel III were to largely go away? Eliminating Dodd-Frank has been a hobbyhorse of Representative Hensarling, the chair of the House Services Committee, for several years and has figured prominently in President Trump’s campaign talking points. But the conventional wisdom has been that any sort of transformational uprooting of the Dodd-Frank and Basel III thicket was unlikely.

That’s what I thought, too. In fact, I have bloviated to that point in the press and on podiums many times. From the moment when everyone’s thinking was refocused that November 9th morning, I had thought that while major disruptions of many things were in the cards, Dodd-Frank and the Basel III architecture really weren’t on the menu. Now I’m starting to wonder. Sure, I still think major retrenchment is not going to happen, but my conviction that it’s impossible is what now gives me pause. Let’s face it, while rarely in doubt, I’m wrong a lot.

So just in case I am wrong, yet again, and some version of repeal or replace happens for Dodd-Frank and Basel III is rejected or slow-walked to death, what might that mean? It’s time to start planning for alternative facts.
Continue Reading Alternative Facts? A World Without Dodd-Frank and Basel III

The 2017 CREFC January Conference, which took place last week at the Loews Miami Beach Hotel, provided an opportunity for those in the commercial real estate finance industry to reflect on an eventful 2016, and look ahead to 2017.  Although attendance was down by almost 11% this year (we’ll blame Zika), around 1,600 people attended this year’s conference.  The mood of the conference was generally upbeat, with most attendees expressing cautious optimism for 2017.  As usual, the parties were lively, and 435 people attended Dechert’s reception at the SLS Hotel on Monday night to indulge in sushi surfboards and the national championship game.

While the panels, meetings and forums provided an opportunity to take the pulse of the industry, and we will get to 2017 and beyond shortly, we need to pause for a moment and look back at a year which may be an inflection point in our industry, our country, and possibly the world.

Continue Reading 2017 CREFC January Conference – Primed for a Comeback