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CRE CLO technology is languishing in the toolbox.  A combination of high interest rates, a mispriced legacy book, an anxious investor base and no real need to refresh capital until borrowers start borrowing again is largely responsible.  When a tool just doesn’t work anymore, you don’t throw it away, you fix it.  I like this…

Here at Dechert, we have market-leading practices in CRE CLO as well as corporate CLOs, including broadly syndicated and middle market structures.  So, every day that I peer into these two alternate universes, I’m astonished at how different these two fundamentally similar leverage technologies really are.  Certainly, even at a modest remove, they look pretty much the same.  A sponsor is looking for match term leverage and has developed a healthy disquietude about the mark to marketness of the repo market and has read CrunchedCredit assiduously and understands that portfolio lenders need multiple modalities of leverage.  Said well-educated sponsor conveys financial assets into a securitization vehicle which issues time and ratings tranched debt to a wide range of investors seeking exposure to the space in a more liquid and more focused risk/yield return way.  Tada!
Continue Reading A Modest Proposal: Why Can’t CRE CLOs Be More Like Corporate CLOs?

The US economy is about to pay the butcher’s bill for a massive disruption of worldwide financial markets resulting from the elimination of the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR.  And, we are doing this on purpose.  It seems the denizens of the heights of our international financial fabric felt they had to do this in light of the discovery that a handful of bankers had unlawfully colluded to cause LIBOR to be mispriced for their personal advantage.  As Captain Renault said, “I’m shocked, shocked!”  This was so bad that we had to blow up the LIBOR index upon which trillions of dollars of financial assets are based?  While bankers behaving badly is a problem, why are we punishing markets because our banking regulatory cadres failed to prevent bad behavior?  At best, this is a monument to irrational rectitude.
Continue Reading Killing LIBOR: A Victory for Irrational Rectitude

On March 15, the day the Japanese Financial Services Agency (the “JFSA”) published its final risk retention rules, Dechert’s CLO team published an OnPoint discussing the new final Japanese risk retention rules and their impact on the CLO market. 
Continue Reading Dechert OnPoint: Japanese Risk Retention: JFSA Favors Diligence Over Disruption

In February, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled in The Loan Syndications and Trading Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, No. 17-5004 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2018) (the “LSTA decision”) that a manager of an open market CLO is not required to retain risk under the Dodd-Frank Act and Regulation RR, because only a securitizer which transfers financial assets into a securitization vehicle must retain risk.  No transfer, no risk retention.

In its decision (joined by Judge Brett Kavanaugh), the Court was very clear in its analysis.  Essentially, the decision said “thank you very much, we can read simple English sentences, and the law is crystal clear on this point (if not on much else).”  The regulators may not elide the transfer requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act by calling managers of open market CLOs securitization sponsors, when they don’t transfer assets to a securitization vehicle.  The Court went on to point out that if this was a loophole, it needed to be fixed by Congress, not the regulators.  Blessedly, a satisfying, albeit rare, victory for a plain reading of our mother tongue.  The regulations actually mean what they say!

The broadly syndicated CLO business has taken this ruling to heart and has been beavering away on transaction structures that no longer provide for the retention of credit risk. One big issue in that space now is whether you can square the circle about avoiding risk retention in the US, while somehow meeting the EU risk retention criteria.  But that’s a bit of legerdemain for discussion another day.  What I want to talk about is the utility of the LSTA decision in spaces other than the broadly syndicated CLO space—particularly for commercial real estate single-asset, single-borrower (SASB) securitizations, a product representing almost half of all CRE securitization offerings this year.
Continue Reading The Boundaries of Risk Retention Now That the D.C. Circuit Has Spoken

South Beach played host to the 2018 CREFC January Conference last week, as roughly 1,800 of our best friends in the CRE lending and securitization industry assembled in Miami to reflect on another year gone by and to muse about what’s in store (or out of store, in the case of retail) for 2018. In keeping with tradition, Dechert’s reception at the SLS Hotel was a hotbed of schmoozing, deal talk and employment fair, as over 400 guests took a break from discussing the SEC to… watch the SEC. The excitement of the Alabama-Georgia national championship game was a welcomed excuse to extend the party well beyond the official ending time (a move that is quickly becoming an expected budget buster for this annual event).

As usual, Dechert was well represented at the conference. Dechert’s Laura Swihart served as conference co-chair, and Rick Jones moderated a riveting (ok, not so riveting) panel on “Floating Rate Loans: Circa 2018”.

Conference panelists and attendees were generally bullish, and why wouldn’t they be after a 2017 that saw $95.3 billion in U.S. CMBS issuance (not including the GSEs). For color, that number is up more than 25% from 2016. Not a bad way to usher in the risk retention era.
Continue Reading 2018 CREFC January Conference – Plateau or Status Quo?

Around this time of year, we slip on the prognostication goggles and take a look forward into the next year.  While there is ample evidence that prognostication is a dodgy exercise, I always tell my folks that the fact that it’s hard to do and extraordinarily unreliable is not an excuse not to have a view.  To not have a view is actually to have one and just not acknowledge that you do.  It doesn’t matter how unlikely we are to get it right: planning beats clinging to guns, God and Brownian motion as a model for the well-lived life.
Continue Reading In 2018 We Are: (a) Doomed, or (b) in the Warm Embrace of Goldilocks

Last week, an article written by Mr. Frank Partnoy, professor of law at the University of San Diego,  appeared in the Financial Times and was subsequently picked up by The Wall Street Journal.  Mr. Partnoy argues that the next global financial crisis will be found inside the CLO industry and that past is prologue.

I think he is looking under the wrong rock for the next global financial crisis and this note should serve as a letter to the editor in rebuttal, as it were.  (Perhaps I’ll send Professor Partnoy his own personalized copy.)

Here’s the news flash:  There will be another global financial crisis.  Death, taxes, the cycle and Page Six misbehavior will never go away.  However, history suggests that the next one will be less severe than the 2007-2009 meltdown which, one can hope will continue to be entitled to the honorific “The Great Recession” for many decades to come. 
Continue Reading The Sequel to the Global Financial Crisis Is Not the CLO! (Ok, Not Yet)

As we are just inking one of the very first pre-risk retention effective date risk retention deals (Potemkin Village anyone?), we are also seeing an increased flow of what are generically referred to as CRE CLOs. It’s time to consider how the Risk Retention Rule (the “Rule”) will apply to this growing market technology.
Continue Reading Risk Retention and the CRE CLO