Rick Jones

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Writing at the beginning of the week in which the government is supposed to run out of money, it’s worth noting the cognitive dissidence between the political chattering classes who clogged the airways this weekend with threats of doom and other apocalyptic noise and what’s actually happening on my desk. If I wasn’t already numbed by the Giants being 0 and 6, it would have been really distressing. Listening to the doomsayers of the 24 hour news cycle on one hand, and returning to my desk on Monday morning and seeing the business of business humming along nicely with little energy around the ongoing government shutdown and potential debt ceiling break this week was really rather odd.

Continue Reading Budgets and Debt: The Cheshire Cat Apocalypse

The new Risk Retention Rule published jointly by the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Securities Exchange Commission, with a little help from the Federal Housing Finance Agency and HUD slouched into the light of day on August 28, in the lee of the holiday weekend. Reportedly, it’s been locked and loaded for months as the regulatory panjandrums wrestled over the politics of the Qualified Mortgage. Really? The day before the long weekend? Isn’t that a tell that it is less than entirely estimable? Didn’t Nixon resign on a Friday? It’s like maybe no one would notice the delivery of a long-anticipated 550 page opus which has, in its gift, the continued vitality of structured finance at large?Continue Reading Risk Retention Re-proposal: The Good, Bad, Ugly And Unintended

Here at Dechert, we have seen a slow but steady work stream over the past several years in assisting institutions in either buying or selling of pools of financial assets. Just recently, we advised Wells Fargo Bank in connection with its acquisition of a $4.5 billion performing pool of UK loans and the simultaneous financing of Lone Star’s acquisition of $1.5 billion NPL and SPL pool, all acquired from what had been Euro Hypo’s and now – Hypothekenbank Frankfurt. Needless to say, we would certainly love to see more.  Continue Reading The European Bank Loan Trade Is Not Yet Done

Out of the dimensionless emptiness of the information vacuum surrounding Dodd-Frank risk retention that enveloped us early this year, the word is now spreading, through what you might charitably describe as informal communications (leaks), that the joint regulatory committee responsible for the risk retention rules is about to re-propose something, perhaps as early as September.Continue Reading TO THE BARRICADES! (AGAIN)

I told the Blog team that I had sworn off writing about Europe for a while; but really. The FT opinionized last week that the EU ministerial decision to agree on a standard “bail-in” to fix broken European banks was a good thing. The editorial ended with a ringing endorsement “something is, however, better than nothing.” Really? It reminds me of Wile E. Coyote bravely trying to use a handkerchief as a parachute as he falls off the butte, again. Beep, Beep.Continue Reading The Consequences of a Failed Banking Union

At last count, we now have four separate risk retention regimes (maybe five) that we need (or will soon need) to deal with as we attempt to restructure any securitization.   They are, of course, all different. And let’s be crystal clear. This isn’t an issue for the distant future. Risk retention is here now and soon, much sooner than most think, it will become a front and center issue for all of us. We’ve written about skin in the game many times in the past (e.g., here, here and here), and I’m not going to re-litigate both the intellectual unsoundness of the notion and the negative impact on capital formation, but as we await developments, I thought it would be useful to compare and contrast the four variations on the theme and sound the heads up.  It’s time for us to focus. Continue Reading Why Does Everyone Want to Make Me Keep Thinking About Risk Retention

There’s a lot of talk these days about the growth of a shadow banking market. Shadow is right! The growth of the commercial lending market outside of the universe of insured depository institutions and life insurance companies is real and its growth is accelerating, yet it is not easy to discern its size, shape and taxonomy. The shadow banking market, which simply means the community of lenders outside of the bank and lifeco cadres, is a logical response to a worldwide tsunami of regulatory activity designed to constrain innumerable facets of financial institutions’ operations which often seems more about retribution than the safety, soundness or integrity of the financial markets life.Continue Reading The Shadow Banking Market: The Shadow Knows

I was entertaining myself early this morning by looking over a joint agency report just released entitled “An Analysis of the Impact of the Commercial Real Estate Concentration Guidance”. This report summarizes the performance of bank CRE portfolios following the issuance of interagency guidance in 2006 entitled “Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk Management Practices”. Everyone will be shocked, shocked to know that through the course of the worst recession in post-war history, banks lost money because of commercial real estate exposure and many smaller and regional banks went casters up. Well, there’s startling news. We taxpayers pay for this sort of thing. Where is the sequester when we really need it?Continue Reading Undue Commercial Real Estate Risks Are Bad: The Mathematical Proof of the Blindingly Obvious

Terrorism insurance has been boring for the past several years. It risks becoming not boring. In the lee of the terrorism attack of 9/11, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, or TRIA, was rapidly passed by the Congress and signed by the President. TRIA provided a federal backstop for private terrorism insurance responding to the unwillingness of the private insurance market to provide meaningful terrorism insurance in light of the unpredictability of the risk and, therefore, perceived inability to price the insurance. TRIA was initially passed in November 2002 and reauthorized in 2005 and 2007. It expires on December 31, 2014. An extension is far from certain.Continue Reading Terrorism Insurance Redux