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On January 20th, the SEC finalized its first batch of many rules to come under Dodd-Frank, requiring issuers to perform reviews of the assets underlying their ABS securities and requiring them to disclose fulfilled and unfulfilled repurchase requests for alleged breaches of representations and warranties.  These have effective dates beginning with 2012 issuance so, to a certain extent, we can kick the anxiety can down the road for a while.  Nonetheless, this is a pretty clear window into what may be a bleak regulatory future.  And that’s important now.  More on this later.

Rule 193 (release here (pdf)) requires an issuer to know something about the assets it’s securitizing.  The issuer is supposed to do diligence to understand the assets it securitizes and tell the investor about the nature of its inquiry.  Curiously, and I’m not complaining here, Rule 193 does not purport to define what disclosures need be made, just that there ought to be “robust" and "transparent” diligence behind them. Its inquiry must be “designed and effected to provide reasonable assurances” that the disclosures about the assets are correct.

Hardly shocking.  Call me silly, but that seems to be what we do in structured finance.  I guess more information about exactly what the issuer did to understand the assets it securitizes could be useful, particularly in asset classes in which the asset level data is sketchy and aggregate.  It’s just silly in CMBS when we already deliver vast quantities of granular data in every deal.Continue Reading The FinReg Sheriff Arrives in Town: Do You Feel Safer?

I have a Leapster Explorer™ on order for my son’s 5th birthday that I seriously hope arrives in the next two days, but in addition to that delivery, there’s a lot of securitization-related rulemaking required or permitted to be delivered under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that was enacted on July 21, 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).

Fewer than half of the rulemaking provisions in Dodd-Frank specify when the required or permitted rule should be issued or go into effect. Some of the Dodd-Frank rulemaking provisions require multiple agencies to issue rules jointly, some provisions require multiple agencies to issue rules separately, several provisions require that rules be issued by one agency in consultation with another agency… Some rulemaking deadlines are based on date of enactment of Dodd-Frank (July 21, 2010), others on the effective date (July 22, 2010, except as otherwise specifically provided in Dodd-Frank).

Below is a discussion about where we are in connection with some of the Dodd-Frank provisions that are of particular interest to the securitization industry.
 Continue Reading What Are We Still Waiting For and When Should it Arrive?

Last week the FDIC approved its final Safe Harbor Rule regarding securitization. That something that sounds so good could be so bad leaves you thinking: can’t we catch a break in trying to repair this damaged economy? To set the stage a bit, the FDIC has a suite of powers, while acting as conservator or receiver of an insured depository institution (“IDI”), to affirm or repudiate contracts and claim or recover property of the IDI. When a failing IDI securitizes financial assets, these powers allow the FDIC to undo the transaction and re-acquire those assets. The possibility that a securitization would be undone by the FDIC is an existential problem for any proposed securitization. But never fear. So long as a transaction meets all the conditions for sale accounting under GAAP, the transaction is proof against the exercise of those powers. Even better, there is a Safe Harbor! Sounds simple, right?Continue Reading FDIC: Mining a Safe Harbor

It’s August 6 as I write this, and the finance industry is taking a deep breath after hustling for weeks to get their comments delivered to the SEC on the SEC’s massive restructuring (pdf) of Reg AB and offering reform.  We here at Dechert had been very busy writing the CREFC comments (pdf) and I’m delighted to see that effort coming to a close (it only took 24 drafts to get to our submission).

To be clear, this is merely the opening act of what will be a protracted insect dance between business and government to settle on rules that deliver on the SEC’s goals of transparency and alignment between issuers and investors while not imperiling the restoration of a healthy CMBS market.  This process will consume the time of many of us for the indefinite future.Continue Reading And Now the Real Game Begins

Back from vacation … The sheer joy of re-engagement cannot be captured in words.  But, can there be a better way of restarting than perusing FinReg?  Being the parochial structured finance lawyer that I am, I start with Subtitle D with the Potemkin village-like name of  "Improvements to the Asset Backed Securitization Process" and Section 13, which is the Proprietary Trading or so-called Volcker Rule provisions.  I’ve got some thoughts.

Let’s start with the improvements to the securitization process.  The good news, as I’m sure everyone knows by now, is that some sensible asset class-specific provisions for commercial mortgages were included in the risk retention language.  More flexibility in sorting out what alignment of interests ought to look like.  Included was the notion that a B piece buyer could meet the retention requirement as could really good reps or underwriting.

The bad news is, just as in almost every other corner of this massive regulatory exercise in political self-indulgence, all the tough and important issues have been kicked down the road to the “Regulators”.  The scope of that delegation is breathtaking.  The regulators have been invited to sort out what is and what is not risk retention (vertical strip, horizontal strip, L strip), what is the “credit risk” for which 5% must be retained, what are good hedges and bad, what is the minimum hold period for risk, what is high quality underwriting, and what appropriate risk management practices of securitizers ought to be.  Wow!  They can do all that?  We won’t have to think at all.Continue Reading Securitization Survives Round One

FASB wants to expand Fair Value to other financial assets.  That bears repeating:  FASB has published an Exposure Draft that would extend the dubious joys of fair value accounting to ALL financial assets.  I so wish I was making this up.  On May 26, 2010, FASB published this missive. Fair Value seems to hold a religious (that’s born again, not Presbyterian) fascination for the academic accounting community, which seems astonishingly indifferent to the horrifying role the viciously pro-cyclical fair value process played in the late “Great Recession.”  Isn’t the definition of insanity doing something a second time and expecting a different outcome?  What are we doing here?

The proposed new rules would require all financial assets, with very few exceptions, to be subject to a mark to market  requirement.  Banks and other financial institutions would be obliged to mark all loans whether held for sale (which makes some sense) or held to maturity.  For loans, the mark would hit Other Consolidated Income (OCI) and put equity on the Fair Value roller coaster.

Continue Reading More From FASB

I can’t stand it. We now have skin in the game provisions proposed by the SEC, the FDIC, the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. 

On CNN the other day, Congressman Barney Frank said that the most important part of the House Financial Reform bill was skin in the game in securitization. Okay, I know we’re probably stuck with it and the world will not end. Capital formation will be modestly depressed and the geniuses on the Street will work overtime to mitigate the impact of all that excess capital sloshing around. But it pains me to give up the fight. Skin in the game is certainly an attractive slogan and, superficially, it makes a great deal of sense. But no one has really looked at the data.  The worst performing sector in the fixed income world was, without doubt, loans to developers, builders and the like. All of this lending activity was on book or, in the skin in the game parlance; the lenders had nothing but skin in the game.

Hello! Lehman failed. Bear failed. Merrill failed (more or less). The GSEs don’t even bear thinking about.   All of this carnage happened not because the institutions were brilliantly successful in laying off bad credit to dumb investors, but because they had skin in the game. In the CMBS sector, mortgage loan originators generally sold 100% of the risk of the loans they originated, and the sector is experiencing losses generally consistent or somewhat better than the performance of commercial real estate taken as a whole. Again, explain to me how skin in the game is going to fix this?Continue Reading Skin in the Game