CMBS

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The gestation of CMBS 2.0 continues apace. A slow pace. The bulk of the deals look an awful lot like CMBS 1.0, but at least one, the Goldman/Citi deal, seemed to come right out of the playbook of the activist investment grade ad hoc committee that has been fulminating for fundamental change in the structure of CMBS. The Goldman/Citi deal saw a B buyer without customary rights to terminate the special servicer, bondholder voting mechanics to remove the special servicer, a consulting ombudsman for the investment grade classes, and constrained special servicer compensation. To say the least, the industry’s notion of what CMBS 2.0 ought to look like has not gelled and will probably continue to see innovation and tinkering for some time to come. Certainly, the industry has yet to absorb whatever risk retention FinReg will bring us as well as possible changes in the structure of representations and warranties and perhaps something to reflect enhanced underwriting.

The talk on the street is that the investment grade buyers responded very well to the Goldman/Citi structure. At the end of the day the structure will follow the money.

So it’s a good time to pause for a minute on the rush to the new structure. Is the new structure, so adamantly pursued by segments of the investment grade marketplace, really an unalloyed good?Continue Reading Careful What You Wish For…

As a follow up to my earlier post, we just issued this article (pdf) about the IRS’ recent Revenue Procedure (pdf) regarding the REMIC rules. The problems inherent in last September’s REMIC Regulations have been well-covered in this blog. In short, the IRS surprised the industry by requiring a mortgage loan to pass an 80% value-to-loan test as a condition to any lien release (the same test required upon initial contribution to the REMIC). While the existing REMIC Rules could have been read to only expressly permit releases of property in connection with a qualifying defeasance, the pervasive view among issuers and their counsel for years was that certain releases (outparcels, condemnation, and partial releases upon pay-down, to name a few) were permissible so long as the release was at the option of the borrower and was subject only to certain objective criteria.Continue Reading REMIC Rules Provide “Safer” Harbor for Releases

Issuers, investors, rating agencies and other industry participants continue to wrestle with the fundamental changes that will come to define CMBS 2.0. Among the (many) issues raised in the "Best Practices" guidelines issued by CREFC during June’s get-together was a proposal for market-wide, programmatic change to the package of representations and warranties given by securitization issuers. Specifically, investors are calling for the formulation of a market standard list of reps and warrants, and for a standard procedure for receiving any deviations on a deal-by-deal basis. One would hope this would sate the appetite of the investing community – a community ravenous after being starved of ground lease exceptions and knowledge qualifiers during the lean years.Continue Reading Industry Considers CMBS 2.0 Rep Package

Dechert has assembled a team to cover the latest legislative and regulatory developments affecting the CMBS, RMBS, and ABS markets. Each Dechert Securitization Update provides timely information on these developments. For a discussion of several recent legislative and regulatory developments that will shape the future of the securitization markets, please see the latest Securitization Update…

According to the Boston Globe, the owners of Boston’s signature office building – the John Hancock Tower – have begun marketing a significant stake in the building.  Many will remember that the Hancock Tower represented one of the Great Recession’s first large-scale mezzanine foreclosures, falling in late 2008/early 2009 when a joint venture comprised of Normandy Real Estate and Five Mile Capital acquired the building via mezzanine foreclosure.  As other industry players were “extending and pretending”, the team from Normandy/Five Mile did their homework, called the borrower’s bluff and bought themselves a building.  And now it looks like it may be paying off.

By accurately predicting the building’s value and strategically purchasing mezzanine debt at the rights levels, the joint venture was able to seize control of the mezzanine stack and force foreclosure.  The master stroke – using mezzanine controlling holder rights to de-lever a bloated (and hugely complicated) mezzanine capital stack, while keeping attractively low-priced mortgage debt in place – serves as a brilliant example of sophisticated distressed-debt investing in CMBS structures and a primer on how to fight and win “Tranche Warfare”.
 Continue Reading The Hancock Tower: A Distressed Debt Success Story?

I can’t stand it. We now have skin in the game provisions proposed by the SEC, the FDIC, the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. 

On CNN the other day, Congressman Barney Frank said that the most important part of the House Financial Reform bill was skin in the game in securitization. Okay, I know we’re probably stuck with it and the world will not end. Capital formation will be modestly depressed and the geniuses on the Street will work overtime to mitigate the impact of all that excess capital sloshing around. But it pains me to give up the fight. Skin in the game is certainly an attractive slogan and, superficially, it makes a great deal of sense. But no one has really looked at the data.  The worst performing sector in the fixed income world was, without doubt, loans to developers, builders and the like. All of this lending activity was on book or, in the skin in the game parlance; the lenders had nothing but skin in the game.

Hello! Lehman failed. Bear failed. Merrill failed (more or less). The GSEs don’t even bear thinking about.   All of this carnage happened not because the institutions were brilliantly successful in laying off bad credit to dumb investors, but because they had skin in the game. In the CMBS sector, mortgage loan originators generally sold 100% of the risk of the loans they originated, and the sector is experiencing losses generally consistent or somewhat better than the performance of commercial real estate taken as a whole. Again, explain to me how skin in the game is going to fix this?Continue Reading Skin in the Game

The changes to the REMIC rules (PDF) were intended, at least in part, to ease restrictions on servicers of securitized mortgage loans. However, while expanding the scope of permitted modifications, the new REMIC regulations also impose a requirement that the modified loan be re-tested to ensure the mortgage loan continues to be principally secured by real estate. This generally makes sense REMICs are intended to hold mortgage loans, and this new requirement presumably prevents a servicer from modifying the mortgage loan so as to be secured by other assets, such as credit-card receivables, cash or other non-real estate collateral.

The problem, however, is that the new regulations also require mortgage loans to be re-tested any time real property collateral is released (even if the release is explicitly contemplated by the loan documents). On troubled multi-property loans (with an LTV of less than 80%), this re-testing requirement potentially puts servicers between a rock and a hard place, forcing them to choose between entering into a prohibited modification (resulting in the imposition of potentially severe tax penalties) and incurring liability to borrower (and potentially, junior lenders) for failing to meet the obligations of the loan documents.Continue Reading New REMIC Rules Leave Servicers with Questions