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We thought it would be useful to give a quick, interim update on the slow-motion train wreck that is our industry’s response to the upcoming effectiveness of the Risk Retention Rule.  For those of you who have been blessedly snoozing under a rock these past couple of years, the Risk Retention Rule becomes effective on Christmas Eve and applies to all transactions closed (priced?) after that date.  The Rule, to generalize a bit, requires the sponsor of a securitization to retain a 5% vertical or horizontal strip with the additional possibility of laying off some or all of that risk onto a qualified B piece buyer or a mortgage loan originator.  For more detail, please see our OnPoints, our risk retention briefing white papers and many, many back issues of this CrunchedCredit.

Here’s the headline in Muddville in May of 2017:

We As An Industry Are In Trouble. 

We as an industry don’t have a scalable solution to the problem.  We as an industry do not know what this will cost, who will pay for it, and to what extent this is an existential risk to CRE capital formation as it has been conducted for the past twenty-five years.Continue Reading Risk Retention: It’s the Fourth Quarter and the Home Team is Getting Glum

Last week, we and a few of our colleagues here at Dechert attended CREFC’s 2013 Distressed Debt Summit. Echoing the mood at January’s CREFC conference, the mood at the NY Athletic Club last week was upbeat about the CMBS market as a whole but the general sentiment, with respect to the distressed debt market, is that good deals (in other words, deals worth making) are harder and harder to come by.Continue Reading Reflections on the 2013 CREFC Distressed Debt Summit

Two and a half years after Dodd-Frank and almost two years after the first hurriedly issued proposed rules, the six agencies (Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) charged with creating risk retention architecture for commercial mortgage securitization have yet to issue a final rule, interim final rule or even a new proposed rule. Since Dodd-Frank provides a two year transition period after publication of a final Rule (or perhaps interim final rules), we might think, no Rule, no risk retention; all is good, no worries. Bad way to think about this. Something is coming out soon. It will be important. It may start affecting our business now. I don’t think we can or should be complacent. More on this later.

What we’re hearing from the panjandrums of the regulatory community is that the horrific concept known as premium capture cash reserve account (PCCRA) is finally cold and dead (although until I see sunlight shining in its grave and a stake in its heart, I won’t be sure), and that the regulation writing committee is settling on an alternative, focusing on risk retention to be satisfied through a B-piece buyer holding a horizontal 5% first-loss strip (the B piece fix was, of course, added to the statute by amendment by Senator Crapo, bless his heart). On this topic the statute said:Continue Reading It’s Time to Revisit Risk Retention

Back from vacation … The sheer joy of re-engagement cannot be captured in words.  But, can there be a better way of restarting than perusing FinReg?  Being the parochial structured finance lawyer that I am, I start with Subtitle D with the Potemkin village-like name of  "Improvements to the Asset Backed Securitization Process" and Section 13, which is the Proprietary Trading or so-called Volcker Rule provisions.  I’ve got some thoughts.

Let’s start with the improvements to the securitization process.  The good news, as I’m sure everyone knows by now, is that some sensible asset class-specific provisions for commercial mortgages were included in the risk retention language.  More flexibility in sorting out what alignment of interests ought to look like.  Included was the notion that a B piece buyer could meet the retention requirement as could really good reps or underwriting.

The bad news is, just as in almost every other corner of this massive regulatory exercise in political self-indulgence, all the tough and important issues have been kicked down the road to the “Regulators”.  The scope of that delegation is breathtaking.  The regulators have been invited to sort out what is and what is not risk retention (vertical strip, horizontal strip, L strip), what is the “credit risk” for which 5% must be retained, what are good hedges and bad, what is the minimum hold period for risk, what is high quality underwriting, and what appropriate risk management practices of securitizers ought to be.  Wow!  They can do all that?  We won’t have to think at all.Continue Reading Securitization Survives Round One

I can’t stand it. We now have skin in the game provisions proposed by the SEC, the FDIC, the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. 

On CNN the other day, Congressman Barney Frank said that the most important part of the House Financial Reform bill was skin in the game in securitization. Okay, I know we’re probably stuck with it and the world will not end. Capital formation will be modestly depressed and the geniuses on the Street will work overtime to mitigate the impact of all that excess capital sloshing around. But it pains me to give up the fight. Skin in the game is certainly an attractive slogan and, superficially, it makes a great deal of sense. But no one has really looked at the data.  The worst performing sector in the fixed income world was, without doubt, loans to developers, builders and the like. All of this lending activity was on book or, in the skin in the game parlance; the lenders had nothing but skin in the game.

Hello! Lehman failed. Bear failed. Merrill failed (more or less). The GSEs don’t even bear thinking about.   All of this carnage happened not because the institutions were brilliantly successful in laying off bad credit to dumb investors, but because they had skin in the game. In the CMBS sector, mortgage loan originators generally sold 100% of the risk of the loans they originated, and the sector is experiencing losses generally consistent or somewhat better than the performance of commercial real estate taken as a whole. Again, explain to me how skin in the game is going to fix this?Continue Reading Skin in the Game

The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg, among other outlets, reported last week that the Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc is in the process of placing a multi-borrower securitization – the first such issuance to come to market since June 2008. Of course, RBS is facing several hurdles as it trailblazes once-familiar territory. The offering, variously reported to be between $300 and $500 million, would represent a significant tool for other banks in determining pricing for future multi-borrower deals. The offering will also serve as a measuring stick for investor demand in the post-TALF world.Continue Reading First Securitization Since 2008: No April Fooling

I’m just about to do another CRE Finance Council (formerly CMSA) PSA after work tutorial. A couple of observations. As a lawyer who packed the sausage casings, it is startling to see how much uncertainty and, in fact, misinformation exists about how a PSA actually works in the community of people who buy and sell bonds and other financial assets. Perhaps not surprising, because who reads these things, except the lawyers who draft them and a few anal B piece buyers, who really need a life? Continue Reading Time to Read that PSA