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ASF 2011 kicked off yesterday, February 6, at the Orlando World Center Marriott.  Dechert attorneys Malcolm Dorris, Ralph Mazzeo, Patrick Dolan, John Timperio, Cindy Williams, Andrew Pontano, Lorien Golaski and I are hosting a cocktail party for clients and friends here this evening.

Congressman Scott Garrett (R-NJ), Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), delivered the featured address this morning, February 7. In his new role as Chairman, Congressman Garrett will be a key player in the debate over the future of the GSEs, the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and the continued development of a legislative framework for a covered bonds market in the U.S.Continue Reading ASF 2011 Kicks Off in Orlando, Florida

On January 20th, the SEC finalized its first batch of many rules to come under Dodd-Frank, requiring issuers to perform reviews of the assets underlying their ABS securities and requiring them to disclose fulfilled and unfulfilled repurchase requests for alleged breaches of representations and warranties.  These have effective dates beginning with 2012 issuance so, to a certain extent, we can kick the anxiety can down the road for a while.  Nonetheless, this is a pretty clear window into what may be a bleak regulatory future.  And that’s important now.  More on this later.

Rule 193 (release here (pdf)) requires an issuer to know something about the assets it’s securitizing.  The issuer is supposed to do diligence to understand the assets it securitizes and tell the investor about the nature of its inquiry.  Curiously, and I’m not complaining here, Rule 193 does not purport to define what disclosures need be made, just that there ought to be “robust" and "transparent” diligence behind them. Its inquiry must be “designed and effected to provide reasonable assurances” that the disclosures about the assets are correct.

Hardly shocking.  Call me silly, but that seems to be what we do in structured finance.  I guess more information about exactly what the issuer did to understand the assets it securitizes could be useful, particularly in asset classes in which the asset level data is sketchy and aggregate.  It’s just silly in CMBS when we already deliver vast quantities of granular data in every deal.Continue Reading The FinReg Sheriff Arrives in Town: Do You Feel Safer?

Another item to add to the growing list of possible unintended consequences of financial reform in connection with ABS: Section 210(a)(11) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Reform Act”)—Avoidable Transfers.

Here’s the who, what, where, when, why and how ABS are affected.

WHO? A “covered financial company” of which the FDIC becomes the liquidating receiver. Under the Reform Act, a “covered financial company” is a “financial company” as to which a “systemic risk determination” (such financial company is deemed to pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the U.S. upon its failure) has been made by the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury in consultation with the President. Entities most likely to be affected are non-bank “financial companies,” bank holding companies, and non-bank U.S. subsidiaries of either– if such subsidiary is in a financial business. An insured depository institution cannot be a “covered financial company.”
 Continue Reading Fa la la la la, la la, OLA

The final day of ABS East in Miami closed on Tuesday late afternoon and we’re back home with no suntans.

Those of us who didn’t overdo it on Monday evening (we won’t mention names) started Day 3 at a panel discussion titled “Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Required Steps for Rebuilding the Investor Base and Future Sources of Liquidity.”

Talking about RMBS, the consensus is that the economics just aren’t working for issuers, let alone the other impediments to getting deals done these days. Current interest rates on jumbo mortgage loans are too low. Over the next six months, however, at least one panelist thinks spreads will come in and the dearth of alternative investment grade securities that are attractive to investors will help the RMBS sector.

One panelist said that too much leverage cracked the world economy and if institutions become so highly levered again, it will happen again. Insofar as regulations are concerned, many of us agree with him that it is irresponsibility that needs to be regulated.
 Continue Reading ABS 2010 Concludes With High Winds and Little Sun

Dechert attorneys kicked off ABS East by hosting a Day 1 cocktail party at the Fontainebleau that was well attended by our friends and clients.

Day 2 of ABS East is underway. The Monday opening panel– Restoring Confidence and Rebuilding the Industry: The Role of Securitization– drew a pretty full house.

The general consensus is that the regulatory bodies are in the way and will cause delay in the recovery of the securitization market. I won’t go so far as to claim it wasn’t broke and didn’t need some fixing, but it’s clear the fixing to come is going to take a while. Without definitive rules, potential issuers can not evaluate the cost to enter the market. If we had a more targeted response to our problems from Congress and the regulators we could avoid this delay.

On the resi front, clearly the GSEs have crowded out private issuance, which has been facilitated by Congress and the Fed. Whereas commercial real estate found a natural bottom, the feeling is that resi never did. And, as one panelist put it, "distressed loans continue to pose a lingering cloud preventing meaningful recovery." The question was posed as to why there was nothing much after Redwood in the resi space. Again, the GSEs are dominating that space. Conforming loan limits have never been higher and it’s increasingly more difficult to even qualify for a jumbo loan under current underwriting criteria. With CMBS, it’s possible to get a reasonable number of loans. RMBS requires many more loans and there’s competition for the best loans.Continue Reading Live From the ABS East

We’re looking forward to ABS East October 3-5. More than 2,200 attendees are expected to gather at the Fontainebleau Miami Beach to discuss current topics in securitization.  Hot topics this year include Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Restoring Confidence and Rebuilding the Industry, the Role of Securitization in Revitalizing the Economy, Assessing the Changing Face…

Dechert has assembled a team to cover the latest legislative and regulatory developments affecting the CMBS, RMBS, and ABS markets. Each Dechert Securitization Update provides timely information on these developments. For a discussion of several recent legislative and regulatory developments that will shape the future of the securitization markets, please see the latest Securitization Update…

I can’t stand it. We now have skin in the game provisions proposed by the SEC, the FDIC, the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. 

On CNN the other day, Congressman Barney Frank said that the most important part of the House Financial Reform bill was skin in the game in securitization. Okay, I know we’re probably stuck with it and the world will not end. Capital formation will be modestly depressed and the geniuses on the Street will work overtime to mitigate the impact of all that excess capital sloshing around. But it pains me to give up the fight. Skin in the game is certainly an attractive slogan and, superficially, it makes a great deal of sense. But no one has really looked at the data.  The worst performing sector in the fixed income world was, without doubt, loans to developers, builders and the like. All of this lending activity was on book or, in the skin in the game parlance; the lenders had nothing but skin in the game.

Hello! Lehman failed. Bear failed. Merrill failed (more or less). The GSEs don’t even bear thinking about.   All of this carnage happened not because the institutions were brilliantly successful in laying off bad credit to dumb investors, but because they had skin in the game. In the CMBS sector, mortgage loan originators generally sold 100% of the risk of the loans they originated, and the sector is experiencing losses generally consistent or somewhat better than the performance of commercial real estate taken as a whole. Again, explain to me how skin in the game is going to fix this?Continue Reading Skin in the Game