This might not be man bites dog news, but in the structured finance world, it ranks pretty close. A U.S. bankruptcy court has ruled that a borrower can agree not to file bankruptcy.

It all starts with the development of a high-end condo project in Aspen, Colorado called Dancing Bear Aspen.

In December 2010, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed a Colorado bankruptcy court order granting a motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of DB Capital Holdings, LLC (the “Debtor”) which developed Dancing Bear Aspen. The Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the Debtor’s LLC Operating Agreement expressly barred the Debtor from filing for bankruptcy.Continue Reading LLC Operating Agreement Prohibiting Bankruptcy Filing is Enforceable

Early last decade, two Dechert partners, Tim Stafford and Dave Forti, published Mezzanine Debt: Suggested Standard Form of Intercreditor Agreement (pdf) in CMBS World. The article proposed a standard form of mortgage-mezzanine intercreditor that provided a portion of the bedrock upon which the architecture of CRE mezzanine lending would be built for the years to follow. At the time of its publication, burgeoning demand for mezzanine debt (and mezz lenders’ desire to create liquidity in their positions) had created a tension among mezz lenders, bond investors and rating agencies – the absence of a form ICA resulted in mezz debt being an inconsistent and pricey financing alternative. The CMSA (now CREFC) form ICA made mezz lending more predictable, less expensive and easier to trade. Continue Reading CMBS 2.0: Has the time come for an industry-form A/B Colender?

The process of transforming 2,000 pages of Dodd-Frank into 25,000 pages of regulations is well under way. Front and center is Risk Retention. I assume you, like me, have been studying the 300 plus pages of the proposed Risk Retention rules (known to the cognoscenti as the Risk Retention “NPR”) for the past several weeks getting ready for the June 10th deadline for comments, right? Oddly, almost a full month passed before the government actually posted the NPR to the Federal Register, something which is usually done in a matter of days. (Tea leaf readers, thoughts?)

We have visited Risk Retention in this Blog before, but today we want to really focus on premium capture as it seems to capture all that is wrong with the NPR. My first reaction to reading the words on the page: Where the hell did this come from? On the fifth read, same reaction. There was nary a hint of the premium capture monstrosity in either Dodd-Frank or in the whispering about the rule-making process before the NPR came out.  Continue Reading Premium Capture Kerfuffle: The Poster Child of What’s Wrong with Risk Retention

On May 5, SIFMA hosted a Spotlight Series: Risk Retention and Qualified Residential Mortgages.  It was immediately apparent that unintended consequences of the proposed risk retention rules (pdf) abound.

The panelists acknowledged that the regulators had a very tough mandate, and that the rules are way more complicated than anticipated.  It was estimated that approximately 60% of the proposed rule will make its way to the final rule, and that while feelings of annoyance with respect to the drafting of the proposed rule may linger, it is up to the securitization market participants to help the regulators provide us with a clear, workable final rule.

Under the proposed rule, calculation of the amount of required risk retention would be based on a percentage of the par value of the ABS interests in an issuing entity.  The discussion began with a couple questions some of us have already been asking …

What do regulators mean by “par value”?  What is an “ABS interest”?Continue Reading SIFMA Spotlight Series: Risk Retention and Qualified Residential Mortgages

Writing from the Acela again, en route to Back Bay Station after a short trip to New York to attend a CREFC After-Work Seminar we hosted. The space at our Bryant Park offices was full – I took a seat in the last row next to interim CEO John D’Amico (he seemed really pleased with the turnout). The meeting was the latest in a series of after-work seminars that CREFC is holding throughout the country (next stop is Dallas). The topic – “A Case Study in Lending from the Perspective of Both Portfolio and Conduit Lenders” – was moderated by Whit Wilcox (HFF) and included panelists Michael Shields (ING Real Estate Finance), Mike Doyle (CIGNA) and Schecky Schechner (Barclays Capital). The panel explored their thinking on loan applications from the perspective of the three corners of the CRE banking world – life insurance companies, bank balance sheet lenders and CMBS conduit lenders.Continue Reading Dechert Hosts CREFC After-Work Seminar

As the CMBS market begins to get its feet underneath it, a number of folks have begun to pine for the public markets. Since 2009, every CMBS deal has been issued as a 144A (or otherwise privately placed). The public market is beginning to feel like a memory. While there seems to have been relatively robust demand for product, a number of bankers say that demand is still somewhat constrained in the 144A institutional market place. They fondly remember the benefits of the public market: liquidity, better pricing, a wider investor pool. As the market rebounds, these bankers suggest that it may be time to dust off the shelves.

And so we thought it would be useful to revisit that bid and ask. For this purpose, we’ll assume that the hypothetical banker is right and that there are significant benefits to be obtained by reanimation of the public deal zombie. That’s the bid.

Here’s the ask. First, there’s that pesky little liability issue. The liability exposure for bankers and sponsors in the 144A market is less than in a public (registered) deal. No liability under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act. That liability is generally pretty absolute (as to non-expertized info) subject only to a diligence defense. Liability in the private market is limited to 10b-5. The need to prove scienter and reliance in a 10b-5 action is a significant burden for an aggrieved investor. The difference in exposure to liability is a distinction not to be sniffed at. Yes, of course we always mean to get the disclosure right. But the underlying assets are complex and there’s an undeniable hunger among the plaintiffs’ bar to “discover” disclosure defects where honest folks, acting in good faith, thought adequate disclosure had been made. (Note also how much more ominous the enhanced liability exposure in public deals will be after FinReg and its progeny become law. As disclosure gets more complex and elaborate, the opportunities to stumble into liability grow exponentially.)Continue Reading So You Really Want To Do A Public Deal?

Last Thursday evening, Dechert partners in our Finance and Real Estate Group and Bankruptcy, Business Restructuring and Reorganization Group hosted a cocktail party for our clients at our New York office.  The main item on the agenda for the evening was simply to take the opportunity to learn more about what’s on the minds of our clients and to discuss the outlook for the remainder of 2011.  Also on the agenda for the night – wine, sushi, taking in the view of the Empire State Building and catching up on the latest activity in the Major Leagues.

With well over 100 people in attendance, we had the chance to hear from a wide variety of clients in commercial and residential loan origination, mortgage servicing and securitization (CMBS, RMBS, ABS and CLOs).  Across the board, I would say the mood was upbeat and optimistic.  Lending is ramping up.  Term sheets are being drafted.  Bankers are talking more about securitization as a viable take out strategy.Continue Reading Dechert’s FRE and BRR Groups Host Clients

As you may have heard, several federal regulatory agencies recently jointly issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPR") regarding the general credit risk retention requirements for asset-backed securitizations ("ABS") and the proposed requirements for exemptions from the risk retention requirement for certain securitizations as mandated under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

Well, we now have our proposed risk retention rule. The regulator class has been incubating this egg for the better part of nine months and we’re all now well behind the, admittedly, magical thinking schedule proposed in the actual FinReg legislation. Now, I’m not complaining. Particularly having read this missive, I’m all into delay.

If you want to read the proposed rule, feel free to take your pick of announcements from the Department of Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the SEC or the FHFA: it’s here—the long-awaited Credit Risk Retention proposed Rule (large pdf). The Rule shows every evidence of having been written by a committee, in fact, by a committee of committees. We all know that the definition of a committee is something with more than two legs and less than one brain. A committee of committees? Need I say more?Continue Reading CMBS: The Risk Retention Proposed Rule Has Finally Been Unleashed; The Comments Begin

Earlier this month, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision upholding the enforceability of a springing recourse guaranty given in connection with a commercial real estate loan that provided for a full "blow-up" upon voluntary bankruptcy. [Author’s Note: the decision can still be appealed: New Yorkers tend to call their trial court the "Supreme Court", their supreme court the "Court of Appeals", their front steps the "Stoop" and their minor league team the "Mets".] Most of our readers are, at this point, intimately familiar with the "bad boy" guaranty and the leverage it provides a lender once the loan hits the fan. Conversely, our readers are also keenly aware of the degree to which sponsors were able to erode the scope of recourse carve outs and isolate liability in poorly capitalized shell entities during the go-go years. The most famous example, of course, being GGP’s ability to run an end-around the bad boy guaranty by filing borrowers and gurantors alike into bankruptcy in 2009 – leaving the holders of $ billions of CMBS paper without practical recourse.Continue Reading Bad Boys: New York Supreme Court Upholds Recourse Guaranty