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While Europe is sorting through Dexia’s assets, it is worth exploring Dexia’s fall in light of Basel III. As mentioned here previously, Dexia had been reporting Tier I capital of roughly 10%. Well done! That would clearly meet the proposed capital requirements to be phased in over the next year. So what went wrong?

Dexia had pursued a strategy of aiming to be the largest player in municipal financing. It owned gobs of sovereign debt. Down-grades and write-downs of that sovereign debt have now left Dexia well short of its Tier I capital requirements (to the tune of 1.7 billion Euros).

This is hardly a man bites dog story. The Gnomes of Basel, and pretty much everyone else, misjudged the perceived credit risks of sovereign debt. Basel I (and, to be honest, II and III) encouraged the holding of sovereign debt by assigning the lowest risk-weight to such assets, meaning a reduced capital requirement. So, the banks bulked up and then: Off the cliff we all go! Is there still a warm glow of knowing one had met international norms?Continue Reading Dexia / Soros – Basel III and the Importance of Faith

Senators Kaye Hagan and Bob Corker’s co-sponsorship of Chuck Schumer and Mike Crappo (who says we all can’t get along) filed “The United States Covered Bond Act of 2011.” I almost think this bill gets support because no one can figure out a compelling reason to be for or against it, so why not show a little whiff of bi-partisanship? The new bill broadly tracks the bill that Congressman Garrett introduced into the House earlier this year, HR-940. We’ve written about this before (it is getting to be quite a list, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and even as a Golden Turkey), and, I gotta say, my views have not materially changed. This remains an answer to a question no one has. Please, someone, tell me why this is important and useful!? Continue Reading Covered Bonds Redux

With Thanksgiving approaching and the holiday season in full swing, we here at Crunched Credit would like to present our annual “Golden Turkeys”.

The Golden Turkey for the Most Confounding Regulation: The Premium Capture Reserve Account

Back in March, the credit risk retention NPR was released. Perhaps the most unexpected (and unwelcomed) part of the rule was the Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account (PCCRA).  The PCCRA provisions actually say that issuers may not profit from securitizations or recoup costs up front. The NPR says that a securitizer who monetizes either an IO or earns a premium on the sale of P&I bonds has to put that money aside to serve as a first loss reserve for any losses on the mortgage loans for the life of the deal–on top of the 5% risk retention requirement. Neither a PCCRA nor a reasonable facsimile thereof was contemplated in the Dodd-Frank Act. Needless to say, PCCRA has generally not gone over very well: Confound it!!

The Golden Turkey for the Best Self-Inflicted Wound: The “Bad Boys”

And by “bad boys”, we mean those who have violated the “bad boy” recourse carve-outs in their loan documents. Although most commercial real estate loans are non-recourse (i.e. the lender can only look to the value of the property securing the loan to settle the borrower’s obligations if there is a default under the loan), most contain certain “bad boy” carve-outs (for example, the borrower filing for bankruptcy or misappropriating funds) from the non-recourse nature of the loan, permitting the lender, in certain circumstances, to look to the borrower (as well as the guarantor) to satisfy the borrower’s obligations. Some borrowers, victims of the great recession, have opted to file for bankruptcy in an attempt to stop the bleeding and dam the "bad boys". Oops. Lenders confronted by misbehaving borrowers have enforced the “bad boy” provisions, and, shockingly, the lenders have been successful! The New York Supreme Court has, on 2 separate occasions in March and July, upheld the “bad boy” provisions. While putting the borrower into bankruptcy may seem like a good solution, if doing so will violate the “bad boy” recourse provisions, it will make a bad situation worse.Continue Reading COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 2011 RECAP: AND THE (ANNUAL) GOLDEN TURKEY AWARD GOES TO….

The other week, I was musing in this blog about the likelihood of more AIB and Bank of Ireland type auctions of U.S. Dollar denominated assets by European banks. In the Wall Street Journal, on Friday, September 23rd, the headline was “Banks in France Cut Dollar Loans”. The article focuses on two of France’s biggest banks, BNP Paribas and Société Générale, jettisoning U.S. Dollar denominated assets.

And then, the news about Dexia broke on October 10th. Dexia is a huge French-Belgian bank, though with a lesser profile here in the States than its more famous Parisian and Brussels-based sisters. The French, Belgian and Luxembourgian governments immediately swooped in to guarantee deposits and provide credit support and began chitchatting about a good-bank, bad-bank fix. The reaction in the markets has been curiously muted. Dexia is huge. Its reported balance sheet is more than 500 billion euros. (And, of course, Dexia had been reporting Tier 1 capital of 10% a couple of months ago. How’d that happen? But that’s a different story.)Continue Reading Always Look on the Bright Side of Life: How Dexia’s Failure Could be Good for Capital Formation

My team and I have spent the better part of the past eight weeks dealing with Irish loans and other portfolios of…stuff. While the conduit market was imploding, pipelines were being aggressively repriced and loan production was shifting into a very low gear, there has been a full scale feeding frenzy for portfolios of seasoned loans. While new loan originations were being dragged through the knot hole of torturous and ultimately paralytic analysis, millions of dollars were spent in high speed car chases for billions of dollars of seasoned loans in awkward, brief and brutal auctions.

Cognitive dissonance anyone? These are alternate universes. In the Ordinary Course Loan Origination Universe, every proposal suffers the death of a thousand cuts: “OK, maybe it’s a pretty good loan but I need to really understand what happens if the anchor tenant leaves, the president of the management company gets arrested and an asteroid hits Ohio. What exactly happens in the cash flow?”  In the Alternate "Bid ‘Em Up Universe", crappy reps, document defects and weird deal features? Fine! Win the bid!
 Continue Reading And the Momentum is Going Which Way?

I just can’t schedule enough time in my day to worry about all the things that seem to demand to be worried about. As I write, this week the Dow closed 630+ down one day and bounced 600 points the next. Yikes.  Between that, the debt ceiling and downgrades, Dodd-Frank, the interminable drumbeat of hostility towards Wall Street and business coming out of the White House, the mess in Europe, the falling dollar, insanely low interest rates, high unemployment, the fact that somehow corporate America seems to still be earning bucket loads of money, and, in general the discomfiting disconnect between our still positive every day deal world and the angst, anxiety and drumbeat of awful news in the macro market, what should we think?  It makes my hair hurt.

But, drawing on my deep and boundless reserve of existential anxiety, I’ve now found a few free moments to worry about the SEC’s new re-proposal on shelf eligibility for asset-backed securities. This missive was released (pdf) on July 26, 2011, and comments are due by October 4, 2011. Continue Reading It Just Gets Better and Better: Reg AB Redux

What the hell is going on here? I’ve got a business to run, and it’s really annoying that I can’t sort out whether we’re in the early stages of recovery or on the cusp of another train wreck. When Dad taught me to drive, he had to keep saying “Don’t look at where you are but where you’re going.” Good advice. Yet only as long as I look at the road right in front of me do I feel OK. If my eyes wander to the horizon, I get really itchy.

This recovery feels very brittle. Oh, sure, transactional activity is way up. If Dechert’s practice is the first derivative of the broader capital markets (and I think it is), then things have been getting progressively more robust for the better part of a year now. We’re growing, we’re hiring, deals are coming in at a goodly pace. Yet, everyone I know with the slightest capacity for reflection is touchy, to say the least.

So let’s do a S.W.O.T. analysis of where we sit.Continue Reading What in the Hell is Going on Here Anyway?: A SWOT Analysis of the Financial Recovery

The process of transforming 2,000 pages of Dodd-Frank into 25,000 pages of regulations is well under way. Front and center is Risk Retention. I assume you, like me, have been studying the 300 plus pages of the proposed Risk Retention rules (known to the cognoscenti as the Risk Retention “NPR”) for the past several weeks getting ready for the June 10th deadline for comments, right? Oddly, almost a full month passed before the government actually posted the NPR to the Federal Register, something which is usually done in a matter of days. (Tea leaf readers, thoughts?)

We have visited Risk Retention in this Blog before, but today we want to really focus on premium capture as it seems to capture all that is wrong with the NPR. My first reaction to reading the words on the page: Where the hell did this come from? On the fifth read, same reaction. There was nary a hint of the premium capture monstrosity in either Dodd-Frank or in the whispering about the rule-making process before the NPR came out.  Continue Reading Premium Capture Kerfuffle: The Poster Child of What’s Wrong with Risk Retention

As the CMBS market begins to get its feet underneath it, a number of folks have begun to pine for the public markets. Since 2009, every CMBS deal has been issued as a 144A (or otherwise privately placed). The public market is beginning to feel like a memory. While there seems to have been relatively robust demand for product, a number of bankers say that demand is still somewhat constrained in the 144A institutional market place. They fondly remember the benefits of the public market: liquidity, better pricing, a wider investor pool. As the market rebounds, these bankers suggest that it may be time to dust off the shelves.

And so we thought it would be useful to revisit that bid and ask. For this purpose, we’ll assume that the hypothetical banker is right and that there are significant benefits to be obtained by reanimation of the public deal zombie. That’s the bid.

Here’s the ask. First, there’s that pesky little liability issue. The liability exposure for bankers and sponsors in the 144A market is less than in a public (registered) deal. No liability under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act. That liability is generally pretty absolute (as to non-expertized info) subject only to a diligence defense. Liability in the private market is limited to 10b-5. The need to prove scienter and reliance in a 10b-5 action is a significant burden for an aggrieved investor. The difference in exposure to liability is a distinction not to be sniffed at. Yes, of course we always mean to get the disclosure right. But the underlying assets are complex and there’s an undeniable hunger among the plaintiffs’ bar to “discover” disclosure defects where honest folks, acting in good faith, thought adequate disclosure had been made. (Note also how much more ominous the enhanced liability exposure in public deals will be after FinReg and its progeny become law. As disclosure gets more complex and elaborate, the opportunities to stumble into liability grow exponentially.)Continue Reading So You Really Want To Do A Public Deal?

Well, we now have our proposed risk retention rule. The regulator class has been incubating this egg for the better part of nine months and we’re all now well behind the, admittedly, magical thinking schedule proposed in the actual FinReg legislation. Now, I’m not complaining. Particularly having read this missive, I’m all into delay.

If you want to read the proposed rule, feel free to take your pick of announcements from the Department of Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the SEC or the FHFA: it’s here—the long-awaited Credit Risk Retention proposed Rule (large pdf). The Rule shows every evidence of having been written by a committee, in fact, by a committee of committees. We all know that the definition of a committee is something with more than two legs and less than one brain. A committee of committees? Need I say more?Continue Reading CMBS: The Risk Retention Proposed Rule Has Finally Been Unleashed; The Comments Begin