Securitization

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Returning to the theme of my most recent commentary entitled God Hates Securitization, I want to elaborate on the point I made there (yes, if you stuck with me all the way through to the end, there was a point):  We need to fight the narrative that banking, finance and securitization are evil.  I am afraid that if we don’t do something here soon, we’ll wake up one morning (probably after the next cyclical downturn is underway) and find pitchfork-wielding villagers outside the gates thinking they have found Dr. Frankenstein’s monster.  Populist anger, whipped up by our critics demonizing the financial sector, unfettered from the necessity to defend these positions in the marketplace of ideas and the court of public opinion, is powerful.  That, coupled with our recent embrace of the weaponization of policy disputes enforced by both civil and criminal legal proceeding, should frighten all of us who make our living in the financial sector.  And, to be clear, it should frighten everyone who understands the importance of an efficient and liquid capital market for the continued success of the US economy.
Continue Reading In Defense of Securitization – Unto the Breach or Close the Wall Up with Our Dead (with Apologies to Mr. Shakespeare)

The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the Papacy has denounced securitization characterizing it (in such an intellectually balanced way) as tainted by “predatory and speculative tendencies.”

Good Lord!

Now, I’m not perfect — I can’t remember the last time I participated in a black mass, inverted a crucifix or committed any of the more striking of your basic mortal sins — but I did close a securitization last week and now I’m worried.
Continue Reading God Hates Securitization?

We at Dechert had our annual business meeting last week in Miami (tough duty).  Nestled in the general atmospherics of bon ami and collegiality were sessions on collaboration and connectivity amongst the lawyers in our firm.  Apparently the data suggested that law firms make more money when the partners of the firm work together.  Flash.  The mathematical proof of the blindingly obvious perhaps, but just in case, we were stentoriously and with great seriousness told that these conclusions were based on rigorous and exhaustive academic research; research undoubtedly paid for by the American taxpayer, along with other studies of similar compelling import such as why Americans don’t like lice.

But the point here is (and I’m not for an instant suggesting that making money is not a valid point) that collaboration is now essential to getting anything done right because we have all become so damn specialized.

All professionals and business folks, including those of us in Big Law, are under enormous pressure to be intensely specialized yet issues are never so neatly defined by those specializations which all too often also mark the boundaries of our intellectual domains.
Continue Reading Life in the Silo

Morningstar has published a proposed method for rating single-asset/single-borrower (SASB) transactions. The new approach is slated to replace the “U.S. CMBS Subordination Model” with respect to SASBs and other forms of CMBS securities with similar credit and diversity profiles, including large-loan transactions and rake certificates. Morningstar has issued a request for comments on the proposal. We plan to provide our thoughts, described below, before the April 20th deadline, and encourage you to do the same. But first, answers to what are sure to be your most burning questions:
Continue Reading Morningstar Requests Comments on Proposed Rating Methodology for SASB Deals

I don’t think risk retention is applicable to a direct issuance securitization.  Many single asset, single borrower (SASB) transactions can be structured to avoid the need to retain risk under the Dodd-Frank Act and the attendant Risk Retention Rule.  There.  I’ve said it.  Read on.
Continue Reading The Astonishingly Shrinking Risk Retention Rule – SASB Transactions Unshackled

Around this time of year, we slip on the prognostication goggles and take a look forward into the next year.  While there is ample evidence that prognostication is a dodgy exercise, I always tell my folks that the fact that it’s hard to do and extraordinarily unreliable is not an excuse not to have a view.  To not have a view is actually to have one and just not acknowledge that you do.  It doesn’t matter how unlikely we are to get it right: planning beats clinging to guns, God and Brownian motion as a model for the well-lived life.
Continue Reading In 2018 We Are: (a) Doomed, or (b) in the Warm Embrace of Goldilocks

Every once in a while we get some good news around the capital markets hood and this is one of those times.  Admittedly, all we’re doing here is fixing a problem which was one of the unintended consequences of the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime and just gets us back to where we thought we were before the issue arose, but hey – a victory is a victory. 
Continue Reading Third Party Purchaser Agreements Don’t Destroy Sale Treatment: A Victory for the Unintended Consequences Resistance

Or maybe not.  At the outset, let’s give credit where credit is due.  It was gratifying to read a governmental missive on the capital markets that made sense, showed an actual grasp of how markets function and an awareness of the issues confronting capital formation.  Best damn thing I ever read coming out of the swamp.

The Treasury Report on the capital markets published in early October is indeed pretty fantastic stuff.  The Report covers the Treasury’s recommendation on re-centering many of the rules around the capital markets over a wide range of regulatory issues important to securitization and capital formation.

Let’s focus on the provisions in this Report that are central to securitization.

These can be summarized as follows:

  • There should be one agency with the responsibility for the Risk Retention Rule and we should dispense with the committee-of-committee that’s been running the clown car for the past couple of years. The old saw that “a camel is a horse built by a committee” is certainly proven by the risk retention experience.
  • Regulatory bank capital requirements treat investment in non-agency securitized instruments punitively.
  • Regulatory liquidity standards unfairly discriminate against securitized products.
  • Sponsor risk retention as set out in the Risk Retention Rule represents an unnecessary cost imposed upon securitization.
  • Some of the new and improved (read: expanded) disclosure requirements under Dodd-Frank are unnecessarily burdensome.

In other words, our regulatory regime needs a certain amount of recalibration to achieve its goals of safety and soundness in the financial market place while not impeding capital formation. 
Continue Reading Treasury Report on the Capital Markets: A New Day

The Wall Street Journal reminded us this month that it was ten years ago, August 9, 2007, that the first regulatory domino in The Great Recession fell as BNP Paribas froze a series of resi investment funds for lack of a functioning market to value the securities. One could quibble about whether The Great Recession could be so precisely dated. Were there the blackened equivalent of green shoots earlier in the year? Did The Great Recession really only begin when the trouble in the subprime resi market morphed into all other credit markets? But that’s merely a cavil. August 9, 2007 is, for me, the date the world changed.
Continue Reading A Tale of Two Years; This Time Will Be Different

A standalone securitization of a portfolio of properties closed in June. To our knowledge, this was the first transaction in recent memory done in a direct issuance format.  In this case, direct issuance means that the sponsor organized the lender and the depositor as well as a borrower and crafted the loan between the lender and borrower, which was simultaneously closed and funded by the bond proceeds from the securitization at closing.  An additional unique feature in this transaction was that the sponsor met its obligations under the risk retention rules with a horizontal cash deposit equal to 5% of the fair value of the certificates.  More on this later.

In this annoying new world of risk retention, the direct issuance model embodied in this transaction can be a paradigm for transactions in the SASB space.
Continue Reading Direct Issuance is Here – A New Paradigm for Single Asset Single Borrower (SASB) Securitization