Securitization

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I can’t stand it. We now have skin in the game provisions proposed by the SEC, the FDIC, the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. 

On CNN the other day, Congressman Barney Frank said that the most important part of the House Financial Reform bill was skin in the game in securitization. Okay, I know we’re probably stuck with it and the world will not end. Capital formation will be modestly depressed and the geniuses on the Street will work overtime to mitigate the impact of all that excess capital sloshing around. But it pains me to give up the fight. Skin in the game is certainly an attractive slogan and, superficially, it makes a great deal of sense. But no one has really looked at the data.  The worst performing sector in the fixed income world was, without doubt, loans to developers, builders and the like. All of this lending activity was on book or, in the skin in the game parlance; the lenders had nothing but skin in the game.

Hello! Lehman failed. Bear failed. Merrill failed (more or less). The GSEs don’t even bear thinking about.   All of this carnage happened not because the institutions were brilliantly successful in laying off bad credit to dumb investors, but because they had skin in the game. In the CMBS sector, mortgage loan originators generally sold 100% of the risk of the loans they originated, and the sector is experiencing losses generally consistent or somewhat better than the performance of commercial real estate taken as a whole. Again, explain to me how skin in the game is going to fix this?Continue Reading Skin in the Game

CMBS 2.0 is coming, we hope (and pray). But boy, it’s taking its good time about it. Putting aside what our friends in Washington may or may not do to the structure of securitization, it’s remarkable to me how shy we in the industry (and its trade organizations) seem to be about putting a stake in the ground as to what CMBS 2.0 should look like. 

With CMBS 1.0, we built the airplane while flying it, so it’s hardly shocking that when tested, some things failed the stress test. On the other hand, we also did a great deal of fundamental work on an industry-wide basis in the early days, to make CMBS work. We created the IRP, the data dictionary and the like. Shouldn’t we do at least that much again?

Now that we’ve had a chance to observe the problems of CMBS 1.0 in the crucible of a wrenching recession, we seem mildly disinclined to take any dramatic action to address structural problems on an industry wide basis.Continue Reading CMBS 2.0

The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg, among other outlets, reported last week that the Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc is in the process of placing a multi-borrower securitization – the first such issuance to come to market since June 2008. Of course, RBS is facing several hurdles as it trailblazes once-familiar territory. The offering, variously reported to be between $300 and $500 million, would represent a significant tool for other banks in determining pricing for future multi-borrower deals. The offering will also serve as a measuring stick for investor demand in the post-TALF world.Continue Reading First Securitization Since 2008: No April Fooling

Note to File:

If you thought about it, when we take something as complicated as a pooling and servicing agreement and then modify it to do a work around changes to GAAP, it’s not going to be pretty. And it’s not. Welcome to the fair value auction. In a CMBS securitization, when a loan defaults, you’d figure the servicer would either work it out, foreclose it or sell it. That’s what we did until 2001 when the accountants concluded that, if the servicer had the ability to try to sell a mortgage loan, the trust would no longer be a qualified special purpose entity or a Q, and the securitization not a true sale. If it’s not a true sale, the mortgages stay on the issuer’s balance sheet and the transaction simply fails to work.Continue Reading Note to File re: Fair Value Auction

I’m just about to do another CRE Finance Council (formerly CMSA) PSA after work tutorial. A couple of observations. As a lawyer who packed the sausage casings, it is startling to see how much uncertainty and, in fact, misinformation exists about how a PSA actually works in the community of people who buy and sell bonds and other financial assets. Perhaps not surprising, because who reads these things, except the lawyers who draft them and a few anal B piece buyers, who really need a life? Continue Reading Time to Read that PSA

The changes to the REMIC rules (PDF) were intended, at least in part, to ease restrictions on servicers of securitized mortgage loans. However, while expanding the scope of permitted modifications, the new REMIC regulations also impose a requirement that the modified loan be re-tested to ensure the mortgage loan continues to be principally secured by real estate. This generally makes sense REMICs are intended to hold mortgage loans, and this new requirement presumably prevents a servicer from modifying the mortgage loan so as to be secured by other assets, such as credit-card receivables, cash or other non-real estate collateral.

The problem, however, is that the new regulations also require mortgage loans to be re-tested any time real property collateral is released (even if the release is explicitly contemplated by the loan documents). On troubled multi-property loans (with an LTV of less than 80%), this re-testing requirement potentially puts servicers between a rock and a hard place, forcing them to choose between entering into a prohibited modification (resulting in the imposition of potentially severe tax penalties) and incurring liability to borrower (and potentially, junior lenders) for failing to meet the obligations of the loan documents.Continue Reading New REMIC Rules Leave Servicers with Questions

As if we didn’t have enough trouble already, we’re now caught in the political cross-fire between Sheila Bair at the FDIC and the rest of the regulatory apparatchnik of the capital markets. We all commented last week on the FDIC’s Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPR”) on the new safe harbor for bank securitization. It seems little more about turf than mission, the FDIC proposed to lard its safe harbor with a number of substantive restrictions on what a securitization transaction would look like, including “skin in the game”, limits on the number of tranches of securitized debt, seasoning requirements on the underlying financial assets and compensation restrictions for the people in the bank responsible for the securitization.Continue Reading Why is Sheila Bair Making Rules on the Safe Harbor for Bank Securitization?