October 2013

Section 926(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to adopt rules that disqualify securities offerings involving certain felons and other “bad actors” from reliance on Rule 506 under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”). New paragraph (d) of Rule 506 was adopted pursuant to the mandate of Section 926(1) and became effective on September 24, 2013. Under such new paragraph (d) (“Bad Actor Provisions”) the involvement of bad actors in a private offering could have the effect of disqualifying the offering from the safe harbor exemption from registration provided under Rule 506. As such the Bad Actor Provisions require issuers that intend to rely on the Rule 506 exemption to undertake additional diligence.

A CLO’s capital stack often includes a portion of subordinated notes that are offered for purchase to institutional accredited investors (“IAI”) and/or accredited investors (“AI”). These IAI and AI purchasers typically meet the requirements to be considered covered purchasers under Rule 506. Due to the fact that IAI and AI purchasers meet the scriptures of Rule 506, CLO market participants have raised questions as to whether the Bad Actor Provisions will require participants in a CLO transaction to undertake additional diligence and whether such additional diligence could negatively impact the market for CLO subordinated notes.Continue Reading The recently finalized “Bad Actor” rules and their applicability to CLO transactions

Jens Weidmann, president of Deutsche Bundesbank, recently wrote a terrific piece in the Financial Times, making the point that the Faustian bargain between European sovereigns, their national banks, the ECB and EU policymakers to encourage European banks to gorge on sovereign debt may be politically attractive in the short run while being fundamentally a horrible idea. With a wink and nod, President Draghi of the ECB essentially told the world that the ECB would keep the European banks afloat. With that assurance in their pocket, and the gnomes of Basel III declaring sovereign debt riskless, requiring essentially no capital, the banks continue to buy their sovereign debt – and buy big. By doing so, the banks become enablers of bad fiscal policy, artificially lowering the risk premia on all risk assets (resulting in mispricing), and clogging their balance sheets with government IOUs. The result: The banks are less able to support the real economy.Continue Reading European Sovereign Debt and the Clogging of the Banking System

Writing at the beginning of the week in which the government is supposed to run out of money, it’s worth noting the cognitive dissidence between the political chattering classes who clogged the airways this weekend with threats of doom and other apocalyptic noise and what’s actually happening on my desk. If I wasn’t already numbed by the Giants being 0 and 6, it would have been really distressing. Listening to the doomsayers of the 24 hour news cycle on one hand, and returning to my desk on Monday morning and seeing the business of business humming along nicely with little energy around the ongoing government shutdown and potential debt ceiling break this week was really rather odd.

Continue Reading Budgets and Debt: The Cheshire Cat Apocalypse

The new Risk Retention Rule published jointly by the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Securities Exchange Commission, with a little help from the Federal Housing Finance Agency and HUD slouched into the light of day on August 28, in the lee of the holiday weekend. Reportedly, it’s been locked and loaded for months as the regulatory panjandrums wrestled over the politics of the Qualified Mortgage. Really? The day before the long weekend? Isn’t that a tell that it is less than entirely estimable? Didn’t Nixon resign on a Friday? It’s like maybe no one would notice the delivery of a long-anticipated 550 page opus which has, in its gift, the continued vitality of structured finance at large?Continue Reading Risk Retention Re-proposal: The Good, Bad, Ugly And Unintended