September 2010

Two weeks ago, As the World Turns – a CBS soap opera documenting the lives of the inhabitants of the fictional town of Oakdale, Illinois – ended a 54 year run on daytime television. A shorter-tenured, but nonetheless compelling, local epic aired this week as Boston Properties announced that it had emerged from a bidding war to secure the Bay Colony Corporate Center – perhaps the premier office campus in New England – for a price of approximately $185 million (inclusive of assumed debt). As a real estate finance attorney in Boston, it’s a property I have fielded a lot of calls about. And, although missing the ubiquitous case of amnesia, it’s a story that would have made the good people of Oakdale proud.

The story of Bay Colony, corporate center, begins with its construction (on the former site of a pig farm along the Cambridge reservoir) at the height of the tech bubble. Located along Boston’s Route 128 tech corridor, the site comprises almost a million square feet of space on 58 acres, with 3,000 parking spaces to accommodate a rent roll that has listed a who’s who of Hub-area tech, venture capital and telecomm tenants. In fact, the sheer number of resident venture firms over the years – Advanced Technology Ventures, Charles River Ventures, Cedar Fund, Ironside Ventures, JAFCO Ventures, Longworth Venture Partners, Matrix Partners, Northbridge Venture Partners and Polaris Ventures Partners, to name a few – contributed to the property’s legendary status among entrepreneurs looking for investment dollars. A single workday onsite could yield three pitches.Continue Reading Distressed Debt: Boston Properties Next Up At Bay Colony

Last week, the Supreme Court of the State of New York handed down a decision in the battle between CWCapital, representing the senior mortgage debt as special servicer, and Pershing’s andWinthrop’s joint venture, who recently bought the mezz debt in this transaction at a deep discount.  Everyone knows what’s going on here.  The mezz debt was bought as a lever to attempt to get control of the property through, or in the shadow of, bankruptcy.  A successful workout would, by definition, compromise the senior debt.  To prevent that, CW sought injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure of the mezz debt and they got it.  Unless this is reversed, it’s game over for the mezz because the foreclosure of the mortgage debt is coming up very soon. Continue Reading The Stuy Town Wars

The general theme of the American Securitization Forum Sunset Seminar held on Wednesday at Dechert’s NY office was the unintended consequences of the Dodd-Frank Act. Our largest conference room was packed with over a hundred securitization industry players all searching for the best predictions on the shape of the massive amount of regulations coming our way over the next few months. First on the agenda was a discussion of the repeal of Rule 436(g) and the resulting Securities Act liability for rating agencies. Dodd-Frank’s intent was to improve the value of ratings by making rating agencies more accountable to investors. Unfortunately, the rating agencies would not consent to their ratings being disclosed and the entire public securitization market was stopped cold. Not helpful for a market struggling to return to "normal.” We have the temporary fix issued July 22 of this year in the form of an SEC No-action letter green lighting the omission of ratings in registration statements, but what happens next? Most likely– the SEC will amend Reg AB Items 1103 and 1120 to not require ratings in registration statements. However, the SEC is considering requiring ratings in non-ABS registration statements, so how likely is this most likely solution really? Other ideas—in no particular order of likelihood: Congress will reinstate 436(g). Doubtful. The SEC will extend the No-action letter indefinitely. Perhaps. Ratings agencies assume the liability or are indemnified by issuers. Maybe. One panelist predicted that in the short run, we’ll have uncertainty; and in the long run, more uncertainty. Consensus is that there’s a long road ahead and harmonization amongst the regulators and applicable agencies is key. Also keep in mind as this unfolds that rating agency accountability is also to be achieved under Dodd-Frank by new private rights of action against ratings agencies (and other parties) leading perhaps to nationally certified class actions. As a result, the rating agencies will be seeking comfort and indemnity from issuers on the accuracy of data given to them in the course of their diligence.

The discussion turned to conflicts of interest and the prohibition against engaging in any transaction that would result in a material conflict of interest with respect to any investor for one year following closing (other than hedging activity or market-making/sales to provide liquidity for the ABS). An example of this conflict would be underwriting ABS then shorting the synthetic ABS that references the first ABS. One issue raised with respect to compliance is the problem of information barriers between departments at investment banking institutions.
 Continue Reading ASF Sunset Seminar: What to Expect from the Dodd-Frank Rulemakings

The gestation of CMBS 2.0 continues apace. A slow pace. The bulk of the deals look an awful lot like CMBS 1.0, but at least one, the Goldman/Citi deal, seemed to come right out of the playbook of the activist investment grade ad hoc committee that has been fulminating for fundamental change in the structure of CMBS. The Goldman/Citi deal saw a B buyer without customary rights to terminate the special servicer, bondholder voting mechanics to remove the special servicer, a consulting ombudsman for the investment grade classes, and constrained special servicer compensation. To say the least, the industry’s notion of what CMBS 2.0 ought to look like has not gelled and will probably continue to see innovation and tinkering for some time to come. Certainly, the industry has yet to absorb whatever risk retention FinReg will bring us as well as possible changes in the structure of representations and warranties and perhaps something to reflect enhanced underwriting.

The talk on the street is that the investment grade buyers responded very well to the Goldman/Citi structure. At the end of the day the structure will follow the money.

So it’s a good time to pause for a minute on the rush to the new structure. Is the new structure, so adamantly pursued by segments of the investment grade marketplace, really an unalloyed good?Continue Reading Careful What You Wish For…

As a follow up to my earlier post, we just issued this article (pdf) about the IRS’ recent Revenue Procedure (pdf) regarding the REMIC rules. The problems inherent in last September’s REMIC Regulations have been well-covered in this blog. In short, the IRS surprised the industry by requiring a mortgage loan to pass an 80% value-to-loan test as a condition to any lien release (the same test required upon initial contribution to the REMIC). While the existing REMIC Rules could have been read to only expressly permit releases of property in connection with a qualifying defeasance, the pervasive view among issuers and their counsel for years was that certain releases (outparcels, condemnation, and partial releases upon pay-down, to name a few) were permissible so long as the release was at the option of the borrower and was subject only to certain objective criteria.Continue Reading REMIC Rules Provide “Safer” Harbor for Releases

I know I return to this theme a lot in this column, but the Unintended Consequences Watch needs to be manned day and night. Today let’s talk about 17g-5. This esoteric sounding SEC rule is intended to diminish the perceived failings of the rating agency culture which has been fingered as one of the principal causes of the “Late Unpleasantness”. The notion was that the rating agencies, hired by the issuers, were mired in conflicts of interest and there were few, if any, structural safeguards to protect investors from bad ratings.

17g-5 provides that rating agencies must require a party retaining the agency to rate an asset backed security (including CMBS) to establish and maintain a password-protected website for all other rating agencies. The website must contain all information provided to the rating agency in connection with the rating. This pertains whether information is provided in writing or orally and to information provided by the issuer or by anyone on behalf of the issuer. The information must be loaded into the website simultaneous with its delivery to the retained rating agency. This was purported to provide a structural counterpoint to the pressure for continuously lower levels by issuer procured ratings.

This has some superficial appeal. To the extent that investors were concerned about conflicts of interest, unsolicited ratings seems an antidote to these perceived concerns. Indeed, on first blush, it’s hard to see an argument that unsolicited ratings are bad.

But on first blush I thought the financial crisis that began about three years ago last month, would be over by Thanksgiving. The story of 17g-5 is yet another reminder that financial systems are much more complex than rule makers perceive them and wish them to be. Welcome back, yet again, to the wonderful world of unintended consequences.

In this case, what has flowed from the desire to do good by providing multiple opinions of value to the investors is a system which is likely to degrade the quality of information and analysis available to investors.Continue Reading Unintended Consequences Redux