The Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis: Investment Risks and Opportunities

We at CrunchedCredit.com hope that our written words provide insight and amusement on topics our readers care about.  And although we enjoy putting pen to paper (so to speak), we are always looking for new ways to connect with our client base and readership. Recently, CrunchedCredit.com blogger Rick Jones joined his partners George Mazin and Holland  West of the Financial Services Group, Thomas P. Vartanian of the Financial Institutions Group, James Waddington of the Banking and Finance Group in Dechert's London office and Ian Hartman of the Corporate and Securities Group in the first installment of Dechert’s Video Briefing Series: “The Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis: Investment Risks and Opportunities.”

Spend a few minutes with Rick and his partners as they present their comments on the continuing sovereign debt crisis. Although the crisis began in Greece more than two years ago, fears of the financial contagion have spread to several other Eurozone countries. Such uncertainty continues to shape the behavior of the U.S. financial markets. The next few months will be critical in determining whether European leaders can hash out a long-term solution to deal with the debt crisis looming over the Eurozone countries. Watch this Video Briefing to find out why Rick thinks this could be an enormous opportunity for those who have capital and can absorb risk.
 

By Matthew Ginsburg

CREFC January Conference Recap: Riding the Wave

The image of the cresting wave looming behind the dais in the Loews' Americana Salon during Douglas Holtz-Eakin’s keynote address posed a central, if unintended, question that was addressed by more than one speaker during the three-day conference.  Are we riding a wave to recovery or facing a deluge of maturing debt?  For most of the 1,200 industry participants that occupied Miami’s South Beach for CREFC’s annual January conference last week, there seems to be no certain answer (other than almost unanimous agreement that South Beach is a better Winter destination than our Nation's Capitol).

Notwithstanding, the overall tenor of the conference seemed to be a determined optimism projected against the overarching blanket of volatility.  European instability, a jobless recovery, a newly normalized, lumbering pace of economic growth and a constantly evolving regulatory framework continue to make uncertainty the only sure bet.  As one might expect, a number of clients we spoke with last week are adopting a cautiously optimistic demeanor for 2012 and plan to tread the market’s murky waters slowly.

Will CMBS rebound (or continue to rebound)?  Will the life co's and other non CMBS lenders be able to fill the void?  How will regulatory reform be implemented?  These questions are so 2010, and yet they stay with us.  Depending on who you believe, CMBS output in 2012 is estimated to be anywhere from $25 billion to $45 billion (compared to approximately $28 billion in 2011).  And even if the portfolio lenders have a gangbuster 2012 (which is, in fact, likely), they won't be able to bridge the void left by $360 billion of maturing debt this year.  As for Washington, we can’t even determine a cogent agenda for regulatory reform at this point, much less predict what the rules of the game will look like.

Perhaps we’ll have answers (or at least a lessened degree of uncertainty) by the mid-year in June.  

 

By:  Matthew Clark and Stewart McQueen

THE NEW NORMAL / A THEORY OF GOOD NEWS: 2012

It’s that time of year when we’re forced to think about budgets and business plans. The pointy headed types from the accounting department want to know exactly what we’ll be doing the second week of next May and, as I’m sure every one of you have said (or thought) when confronted with such bureaucratic insanity: If I knew exactly what I’d be doing and what the business environment would look like next year, I would (A) not tell you, and (B) stop doing this. But with that said, and notwithstanding my crystal ball is as opaque as the bottom of a Stygian cave, we need to plan.

So, I’ve been thinking. What the heck are we going to do next year? Is the CMBS market irrevocably broken? Was Credit Suisse trigger happy or prescient, stepping away from the market? Will investors buy bonds? Will European banks sell assets like it is the last hour of a bake sale? How about the US banks? Will banks make loans? Will we pare down the list of eager CMBS lenders to 10? Will the life companies replicate their boisterous 2010-2011? Will we finally see the bubble of refinancing we have been predicting to occur in two years for the past five, actually happen in 2012?    Will investors commit enough money to the high yield sector and will the mezzanine market really be hot? Will we ever do a covered bond? Will we ever do a CRE CDO (like I’ve been prattling along about for quite a while now)?   Live in hope; die in despair, as my daddy-in-law used to say. Will real estate people actually build new stuff and launch new projects? Do you think China would lend us a construction crane or two just for a while? Will risk retention arrive? Reg AB 2.0? What about the Volcker Rule? Will the rating agencies continue to conduct business as usual? What will the elections bring? Will the Greeks sell the Parthenon? Will the Italians sell the Tower of Pisa? Will haughty France play the poodle to Mrs. Merkel? What ultimately about Germany? Will the Europeans continue to support their champion national banks while they compete for a starring role in the next Night of the Living Dead movie? Forever?

As you can see, I’m pretty good at questions. The trouble is that, when you run a business, you’ve got to come up with some answers. As I’ve said to my colleagues around here, we need to have a view. Not taking a view is taking a view and no matter how daunting the prognostication game can be, you gotta do it.

So, with that said, this is what I think.

·         No deep recession for the United States (if there is, ignore everything below).

·         The job situation will continue to steadily improve, but the new normal of structural unemployment will be 6-7%, not 4-5%. The new normal of full employment notwithstanding, this will lead to continued firming of the demand for commercial real estate space.

·         Private deleveraging will continue, housing will finally make a bottom, and CRE markets will modestly expand.

·         Here in the U.S., we won’t fix the debt problem anytime soon. I hope Keynes was right about aggregate demand and government spending, but I doubt it.

·         EU banks will sell U.S. and EU assets

·         U.S. banks will sell assets in a less panicky way – portfolios will be balanced

·         The EU crisis will have its own “trading range”. The EU will not collapse, no one will leave, but it will not get healthy, either. No European economic growth for the foreseeable future, or until they finally learn high taxation, protectionism and a massive regulatory apparatus is not a recipe for growth.

·         EU countries will not let national champion banks fail, period.

·         There will be a global tightening of credit and U.S. banks will have a material competitive advantage, if our own regulators don’t do more stupid things.

·         Kicking the can down the road on bad loans is getting closer to its final denouement. More loans will get resolved, loan sales, real restructurings and rescue capital trades will accelerate

·         Structured finance will be used broadly to facilitate disintermediation. Liquidating trusts, seasoned low leverage CMBS, and CRE CDOs will all be broadly used.

·         There will be a CMBS business. Modestly better than 2011. What’s broken will trend toward being fixed – bid/ask spreads will come in. Rating agency models will migrate to levels at which capital formation can occur, and the gap between the CMBS bid and the portfolio bid will come in as the portfolio bid will simply be insufficient to deliver all the capital required by a modestly growing CRE sector.

·         Further, regulatory action will continue to be characterized by unintended consequences being markedly more costly than the value of the intended good. This will continue to threaten the recovery and all of the good stuff above.

·         The election matters, hugely. If the market concludes that Mr. Obama will remain in the White House and the Democrats may get more seats in the House and Senate, much of the good news above is materially trumped.

·         Macro/global tail risks are at an all time high. Really bad stuff could completely shuffle the deck.

 

So what does all this mean for planning? We will see increased transactional activity in the CRE and structured finance space. Our clients are likely to be busy. There will be a premium on ingenuity, and innovation and scale will be rewarded.

 

So, here’s my plan: Go all in.  We’ll grow. We’ll invest in innovation and deliver scale. When the risk/reward traffic lights are flashing green and the downside risks, while pretty catastrophic, still look tailish, it’s an easy call.

 

I’m looking forward to 2012; I think.

COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 2011 RECAP: AND THE (ANNUAL) GOLDEN TURKEY AWARD GOES TO....

With Thanksgiving approaching and the holiday season in full swing, we here at Crunched Credit would like to present our annual “Golden Turkeys”.

The Golden Turkey for the Most Confounding Regulation: The Premium Capture Reserve Account

Back in March, the credit risk retention NPR was released. Perhaps the most unexpected (and unwelcomed) part of the rule was the Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account (PCCRA).  The PCCRA provisions actually say that issuers may not profit from securitizations or recoup costs up front. The NPR says that a securitizer who monetizes either an IO or earns a premium on the sale of P&I bonds has to put that money aside to serve as a first loss reserve for any losses on the mortgage loans for the life of the deal--on top of the 5% risk retention requirement. Neither a PCCRA nor a reasonable facsimile thereof was contemplated in the Dodd-Frank Act. Needless to say, PCCRA has generally not gone over very well: Confound it!!

The Golden Turkey for the Best Self-Inflicted Wound: The “Bad Boys”

And by “bad boys”, we mean those who have violated the “bad boy” recourse carve-outs in their loan documents. Although most commercial real estate loans are non-recourse (i.e. the lender can only look to the value of the property securing the loan to settle the borrower’s obligations if there is a default under the loan), most contain certain “bad boy” carve-outs (for example, the borrower filing for bankruptcy or misappropriating funds) from the non-recourse nature of the loan, permitting the lender, in certain circumstances, to look to the borrower (as well as the guarantor) to satisfy the borrower’s obligations. Some borrowers, victims of the great recession, have opted to file for bankruptcy in an attempt to stop the bleeding and dam the "bad boys". Oops. Lenders confronted by misbehaving borrowers have enforced the “bad boy” provisions, and, shockingly, the lenders have been successful! The New York Supreme Court has, on 2 separate occasions in March and July, upheld the “bad boy” provisions. While putting the borrower into bankruptcy may seem like a good solution, if doing so will violate the “bad boy” recourse provisions, it will make a bad situation worse.

The Golden Turkey for the Best All-Around Performance: Europe

I defy anyone to explain European monetary and fiscal policy. No amount of magical thinking or psychotropic drug therapy can make this make sense. The explosive dysfunctionality of common monetary and fractured fiscal policies have been baked in the cake since inception and ignored by a sheer act of will. The inevitable denouement from this toxic brew was certain; not whether but when. While perhaps a common currency made sense from the perspective of keeping German troops out of Belgium, it was a disaster in a world where the business cycle was alive and well. The profligacy of European economies, the attendant sovereign debt crisis, the European banking crisis, world banking tensions and European recession can all be laid at the feet of the profound suspension of reality that this was some sort of a good idea.

The Golden Turkey for Pouring Gasoline onto Fire: Basel III

OK, I get the notion that banks need more capital, that the socialization of risk needs to be decoupled from market rewards, and that the system really did go casters up. But…on the cusp of a recovery, we have: the SIFIs (for the blessedly uninitiated, systemically important financial institutions), the Volcker Rule, Skin in the Game and Basel 2.5, Basel 3.0, and on and on. While we are desperately trying to re-start the economy, it seems ideologically bold, to be charitable, to embark simultaneously on dozens of untested, game-changing linked policy initiatives that will, if they do nothing else, constrain capital formation. Isn’t that a bit like citing the Titanic’s kitchen’s for unsanitary brioche pans?

The Golden Turkey for the Abbot Arnaud-Amaury Lookalike Contest

The good Abbot has won notoriety through the ages for the investiture of the City of Béziers during the Albigensian heresy. For, when confronted with the fact that many of the good citizens of Béziers were non-heretical Christians, he said something along the lines of, “Kill them all, God will choose the innocent”. Our illustrious chattering class seems to have concluded, on both the red meat right and the loony left, that trashing bankers makes good copy and good politics. Sticks and stone are bad enough, but an un-relenting policy of demonization makes for fertile ground for bad policy prescriptions, opportunistic litigation, and prosecutorial grandstanding. Whack the bankers, whack them all! Whack a mole! One would not be shocked if our banking sector was left with precious little energy for the aggressive pursuit of capital formation. The fact that the banking sector is working hard to do its job and support commercial real estate with capital is a tribute to our bankers.

The Golden Turkey for Unintended Consequences: 17-g-5

This is a very crowded category. The more we try to prescriptively engineer financial and market outcomes with legislation, the more we encounter the goblin of unintended consequences. You’d think at some point we’d create an OMB for unintended consequences to make a sustained effort think through the chances for unintended consequences before our elected representatives pose behind the President to get their picture taken and cop a commemorative pen. And then we all get to regret the legislative product. And the winner is: Rule 17-g-5. This is a rule introduced earlier this year which required issuers to maintain password protected data sites accessible to all NRSROs to see all the information in connection with a structured finance product rating recorded in these sites so that other, unretained rating agencies could analyze the data, publish an unsolicited rating and, therefore, keep everyone honest. Certainly, the Hobbesian instinct behind this notion to utilize the power of raw market capitalism to achieve the goal of breaking the perceived cozy relationship between rating agencies and bankers was estimable, but it didn’t work. To my knowledge, no unsolicited rating has occurred. And it’s pretty clear why. The cost of producing a rating on a CMBS transaction is enormous. If no one’s going to pay you for it, it’s hard to understand why an agency would undertake all that work to make a point. Moreover, here’s what makes this prize so well earned: the requirement that all information made available to the retained agencies be made simultaneously available to all NRSROs has meant that banks have had to become punctilious about controlling information flow to avoid violating the shared information rule.  In consequence, the NRSROs are getting much less information as conversation has been cut off and everything has been reduced to written submission. Moody’s showed courage this year by writing a thought piece that said 17g-5 was reducing the quality of ratings. They are right.  Now that's a useful outcome, right?

The Golden Turkey for the Best Idea Ever, that doesn’t Work: Covered Bonds

In the past few weeks, the companion bill to the U.S. Covered Bond Bill 2011 has been introduced into the Senate. The Senate bill tinkers with the version re-introduced by Congressman Garrett into the House earlier this year and, in some respect, improves the enabling legislation. We’ve been introducing covered bond bills and talking about covered bonds for years. Not much has happened. No one has actually made a compelling case that there are major financial institutions in the United States of America that want to use covered bonds. No one has ever made a compelling argument that this is accretive to the cost of capital without an offsetting negative impact on the market. Finally, there is no evidence that anyone in our dysfunctional bicameral legislature actually thinks a bill will pass anytime soon. Now don’t get me wrong, we at Dechert love the covered bond, and hope one day to be retained by serious players with serious budgets to make one of these transactions really work. But frankly, and to misquote Winston Churchill, “Never has so much been said by so many about so little”.

The Golden Turkey Send off: Here’s to you Mr. Politician

Whether you are a Keynesian economist (like many politicians pretend not to be) or a follower of F. A. Hayek (like all of the Republican potential nominees proclaim to be), one thing is for certain, we can all agree that the markets are volatile and 2011 is not the year to be an incumbent politician. So, with Thanksgiving right around the corner and the end of the year drawing closer, we at Crunched Credit would like to give a friendly send-off to those politicians who have done much to keep the news entertaining but little to calm the markets. To all of “them” (we all know who they are, even if they don’t) and to the rest of “them” still standing, “It’s the Economy, Stupid”!!!

By the Crunched Credit Team.